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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
OSCAR IVAN CORNEJO, 
Defendant/Appellee. : 
CaseNo.20050060-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The State appeals from a pretrial dismissal with prejudice of an information charging 
driving under the influence of alcohol with priors, a third degree felony; failure to respond 
to an officer's signal to stop, a third degree felony; driving on a suspended or revoked 
license, a class B misdemeanor; and no evidence of security, a class B misdemeanor. This 
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-18a-1(a) & 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 
2004). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE. PRESERVATION. 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Did the trial court exceed the limits of reasonability when it dismissed with prejudice 
for lack of speedy trial after the prosecutor asked for a continuance because she was not 
prepared for an unnoticed on-the-spot suppression hearing, set only minutes after the a 
constitutional challenge was raised for the first time on the morning of trial? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A denial of a continuance is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Riddle v. Celebrity 
Cruises, 2004 UT App 287, % 5, 105 P.3d 970. A dismissal of an information for 
"unreasonable delay" is also reviewed for abuse of discretion; however, a court has no 
authority to dismiss with prejudice unless it first finds "unconstitutional delay," that is, a 
violation of the right to a speedy trial. Salt Lake City v. Dorman-Ligh, 912 P.2d 452, 456 
(Utah App. 1991) (recognizing that dismissal with prejudice requires a finding of 
unconstitutional delay or a violation of the statute of limitations). Cf. State v. Trafny, 799 
P.2d 704, 706 (Utah 1990) (applying a balancing test to speedy trial determinations). The 
issue was preserved atR118: 10, 14-18, 22-25, 30-43, 47, 50-55. 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Copies of the following determinative provisions are attached in Addendum A, 
together with any other provision cited in argument: 
Utah R. Crim. P. 12 - Motions; 
Utah R. Crim. P. 25 - Dismissal without trial; 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.5 (West 2004) Admissibility of chemical test 
results in actions for driving under the influence—Weight of evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On the morning of the trial, prior to jury selection, defense counsel revealed for the 
first time that he was challenging the admission of the result of an involuntary blood draw. 
Over the prosecutor's objection, the trial court ordered an immediate evidentiary hearing to 
address the constitutional admissibility of the draw. The Highway Patrol sergeant who 
authorized the draw, but was not otherwise a trial witness, was unavailable. The prosecutor 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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asked for a continuance. The trial court refused. The prosecutor then moved to dismiss the 
information without prejudice. Instead, the court dismissed the information with prejudice 
based on a finding of unconstitutional trial delay. To assess the validity of this ruling, the 
procedural history from filing to dismissal is presented in detail.1 
On February 11, 2004, defendant was arrested and charged with driving under the 
influence of alcohol [DUI], a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 
(West 2004), failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5 (West 2004), driving on a suspended or revoked 
license, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-227(3) (West 2004), 
and no evidence of security (insurance), a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-12a-303.2 (West 2004) (R. 1-2).2 Defendant appeared before a magistrate the 
same day (R. 11-12). The Ogden Public Defender's Office was assigned to represent him 
(id.). Two days later, private counsel, now appellate counsel, entered his appearance (R. 14). 
At the initial arraignment on February 11, the magistrate set bail, but ordered 
defendant released on his own recognizance if Pretrial Services determined that he qualified 
*In compliance with the marshaling requirement imposed on an appellant, the 
record facts are fully set forth in the State's Statement of the Case. Discussion of why the 
marshaled facts do not support the trial court's finding of a speedy trial violation will be 
addressed in argument. See State v. Orr, 2004 UT App 413,19, 103 P.3d 164 
(reaffirming an appellant's duty to marshal all evidence in support of a challenged factual 
finding and then "show that, even when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to 
the trial court's ruling," the finding is clearly erroneous) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
2The DUI was elevated to a third-degree felony based on defendant's prior six DUI 
convictions since 1997 (R. 9). 
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(R. 11-12). Eight days later, on February 19,2004, defendant was released from jail on bond 
(R. 19). 
Defense Continues March 1 Hearing 
A preliminary hearing was set for Monday, March 1, 2004 (R. 11-12). On that day, 
the State's witnesses were present and the prosecutor was ready to proceed (R. 15-16,101 -
02). However, on the previous Thursday, defense counsel had requested a copy of the police 
videotape of defendant's pursuit and arrest to use in preparation for trial (R. 21-22). By 
Monday, defense counsel had not yet received the tape, but was not sure if his "request went 
to the wrong place or something" and asked for a continuance to allow him time to obtain 
the tape (R. 15-16; R116: 4). The magistrate (Judge Roger Dutson) continued the 
preliminary hearing to March 29,2004 (R. 15-16). On March 4,2004, the court ordered that 
a copy of the tape be released to defendant (R. 15-16, 21-22). 
Defense Continues March 29 Hearing 
On March 29, the State's witnesses were present and the prosecutor was again ready 
to proceed with the preliminary hearing (R. 25-26, 103-04). Defense counsel had not 
received the videotape and asked to continue the preliminary hearing for five weeks—to May 
3,2004—to accommodate his schedule (Rl 16:5). When the magistrate (Dutson) questioned 
the length of the continuance, defense counsel responded: 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Yeah, we were going to do it in two weeks, but that's spring break, and I'm 
afraid it conflicts with my schedule, so May 3rd would work the best for us if 
that's okay, Your Honor, and we would waive any speedy requirements that 
might fall in there. 
(id.). The hearing was continued to May 3 as requested (R. 25-26). 
The Parties Jointly Continue May 3 Hearing 
On May 3, the prosecutor again was ready to proceed with the preliminary hearing 
(R116: 7). A possible first degree felony involving defendant was under review by the 
County Attorney's Office (Rl 16:7-8). The prosecutor and defense counsel jointly asked for 
a continuance to see if the new charge would be filed (id.). Defense counsel asked that the 
preliminary hearing be continued for at least one month (Rl 16: 8). The magistrate (Dutson) 
agreed and continued the hearing to June 7, 2004 (R. 27-28). 
Defense Continues June 7 Hearing 
On June 7, defense counsel said the no charge would be filed (R116: 10). A 
preliminary hearing was previously scheduled for that day, but defense counsel asked that 
it be set over for five weeks—to July 12,2004—because he had "Scout Camp and other out-
of-state commitments" (R116: 10). The magistrate (Dutson) continued the hearing as 
requested to July 12 (Rl 16: 11). 
Prosecution Continues July 12 Hearing; 
Defense Extends Date 
The prosecutor subpoenaed four witnesses for the July 12 preliminary hearing, but 
when one of them was unavailable, asked for a one-week continuance (R. 105-08; Rl 16:12). 
Defense counsel had no objection to the continuance and asked for a further extension of one 
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month to August 9, 2004 (Rl 16: 12). The magistrate (Dutson) continued the hearing to the 
date requested by defendant (R. 31-33). 
Preliminary Hearing Held August 9 
On August 9, a preliminary hearing was conducted before Judge Ernest Jones (R. 33-
34). Defendant was bound over for trial as charged (id.).3 The same day, he was arraigned 
before Judge Dutson, who told defendant to file any motions to suppress evidence by 
September 1, 2004 (R. 33-34). An evidentiary hearing was set for October 6, 2004 (id.). 
Defense Moves to Suppress Evidence Derivative of Illegal Stop 
Defendant filed a motion to suppress on September 8, 2004 (R. 36-37). In the 
accompanying memorandum, defendant claimed that he committed no traffic offense and, 
therefore, the stop of his vehicle was illegal and any derivative evidence should be 
suppressed (R. 3 8-46). The prosecutor opposed the motion and set forth the factual basis for 
defendant's traffic violations and the officer's pursuit (R. 5 8-62). The prosecutor additionally 
stated in her memorandum: 
Subsequent involuntary blood and urine tests revealed that Defendant had a 
blood-alcohol level of 0.16 at the time of his arrest. 
(R. 59). The prosecutor also sent defendant a copy of the Highway Patrol policy governing 
involuntary testing. Defendant, however, did not challenge the involuntary tests. 
3No tape of these proceedings could be located and no transcript is available. 
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The evidentiary hearing was conducted as scheduled (Rl 16:15-64). On October 18, 
2004, Judge Dutson denied defendant's motion to suppress after finding "clearly adequate 
evidence" to support the stop (Rl 16: 65). 
December and Alternate February Trial Dates Set 
The case was then set for pretrial conference on November 8, and for trial on 
December 15, 2004, as a second setting because another case was already for that trial that 
day (Rl 16: 67-68). The prosecutor commented, "[t]he sooner the better" (Rl 16: 68). 
Defendant subsequently moved to continue the pretrial conference one week—to 
November 15, 2004—because the parties were in settlement negotiations (R. 68-69). 
On November 15, defense counsel informed the court that the case could not be 
settled (R. 70-71). He asked if in addition to the previously scheduled December trial date, 
an alternate trial date could be set as a first setting on February 3,2005 (Rl 16: 70-71). The 
trial court reserved both dates for trial and scheduled another pretrial conference for 
November 29, 2004 (id.). 
The November 29 pretrial conference was subsequently continued to December 6, 
2004, at defendant's request so he could confer with the prosecutor and determine if the other 
case scheduled for December 15 would be tried (Rl 16: 74). 
On December 6, a pretrial conference was conducted (Rl 16: 75-76). Defendant's 
case was now the first setting for December 15 (id.) The prosecutor said she was ready for 
trial (id). Defense counsel casually warned that he might need a continuance (id.). He had 
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subpoenaed information from the Highway Patrol, but what he received was the "wrong 
information" and he was planning on re-subpoenaing the agency (id.). 
Defense Reveals Objection to Blood Draw 
On December 15, the parties appeared for trial. The prosecutor was ready to proceed 
(Rl 18:38). In chambers, just prior to jury selection, defendant for the first time objected to 
admission of the blood test result (Rl 18: 12). Defense counsel explained that he had not 
raised the issue prior to trial because he wanted the jury to hear the circumstances of the 
involuntary draw to support his theory of police misconduct (Rl 18:5-6,11,17-18,26,46-47, 
52). Counsel said he planned on objecting to the test result mid-trial and in front of the jury 
(R118: 5, 11-12,26-27,47). 
The prosecutor objected (Rl 18:7-8,21). The prosecutor argued that defendant knew 
the draw was involuntary, but chose not to challenge its admission in a pretrial motion to 
suppress (R118: 14-15, 38-39). Consequently, the prosecutor asserted, the challenge was 
waived pursuant to rule 12, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rl 18: 22-25, 35). 
Trial Court Orders Immediate Evidentiary Hearing 
The trial court agreed that defendant strategically chose not to raise his challenge to 
the admissibility of the blood draw until the last minute, which was a "heck of a time to be 
bringingitup"(R118:7,11,17-18,26,46-47,52). Nevertheless, the court believed that an 
involuntary blood draw was inadmissible unless the court preliminarily ruled on its 
constitutional admissibility (Rl 18:7-10,29). The court believed it had this obligation even 
if defendant remained "silent" and did not challenge the evidence (R118: 49-51). 
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Accordingly to the court, the prosecutor could not rely on waiver and was obligated to 
establish the constitutionality of the draw before its result could be admitted (Rl 18: 34, 39, 
50). See Addendum C (Transcript of December 15 Proceedings). 
The court released the jury until the afternoon and ordered an on-the-spot evidentiary 
hearing (Rl 18: 29-32). He told the prosecutor she had fifteen minutes to get ready (R118: 
31 -32,34). The prosecutor objected and explained that the Highway Patrol sergeant who had 
authorized the draw, but was not otherwise a trial witness, was traveling to Idaho and 
unavailable (R118: 30). The State's trial witnesses, including the toxicologist and other 
foundation witnesses, were present and could establish the evidentiary basis for admission 
of the test result, but not the agency's basis for its authorization (R118: 21, 38, 41). The 
prosecutor was aware of the recent involuntary blood draw case, State v. Rodriguez, 2004 
UT App 198, 93 P.3d 854, cert granted, 100 P.3d 220 (Utah 2004), but needed additional 
time to prepare the legal issues once she knew defendant's specific grounds for objection 
(R118: 9-10, 22, 35-36, 41).4 See Add C. 
Prosecution Moves to Continue and to Dismiss Without Prejudice 
Because the prosecutor was not prepared to proceed with an immediate evidentiary 
hearing, she moved to continue the trial to the alternate trial date (February 3) and moved to 
continue the suppression hearing to some date in the interim (Rl 18: 36). Defense counsel 
objected because he was prepared to proceed and "it would be prejudicial to my client not 
to have the trial in the month of December but to bump it off to when all the [holiday] debts 
4Defendant never stated the grounds he intended to raise in objection to the draw. 
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hit in February" (Rl 18: 27).5 The trial court denied the continuance (Rl 18: 36). See Add. 
a 
The prosecutor then moved to dismiss the information subject to refiling (Rl 18: 30, 
42, 48-49). The court responded that any dismissal would be with prejudice "because the 
defense is ready to proceed... and the reasons for the continuance are unjustifiable" (Rl 18: 
30, 55). The prosecutor explained that if she proceeded on the dispositve motion and 
received an adverse ruling, she effectively could not appeal because trial would immediately 
commence (Rl 18:17,23). In an effort to remedy this problem, the court offered to sever the 
DUI charge (which was dependent on the blood draw) from the other charges (Rl 18:52-53). 
The prosecutor responded that severance would not help her because the charges were all 
part of a single criminal episode (R118: 53-55). If the non-DUI charges were tried first, 
subsequent prosecution of the felony DUI would likely be barred under the single episode 
provision and/or double jeopardy (id.). The court summarily rejected this concern (Rl 18: 
55). 
Trial Court Dismisses with Prejudice 
The prosecutor challenged the authority of the court to dismiss with prejudice (Rl 18: 
37-40). Citing rule 25, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the prosecutor asserted that if the 
5Defense counsel explained that there was a "legend" among the defense bar that 
"prosecutors will not try cases during December because they believe jurors for the will 
of the season or whatever it is are more lenient" (Rl 18: 27). The court called this a 
"fiction" and irrelevant; the court's concern was that the jury was "out here ready to go to 
trial" (Rl 18: 27-29). 
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court dismissed with prejudice, "the state would ask for findings that it's being made based 
on unconstitutional delay" (Rl 18: 39). The court responded: 
It isn't. I'm just - well, it could possibly be. But I - what I'm saying is the 
parties are here, ready for trial, you should be prepared to go to trial today and 
you've had ample notice of this trial date. And I am - the defense has 
mentioned in chambers that they want the trial today, they're here ready to go, 
and so we'll either have the trial today or you can move to dismiss it without 
prejudice - or with prejudice. 
(Rl 18:39). After the prosecutor again asked if the court was finding unconstitutional delay, 
the court repeated: 
I'm denying your motion because this case has been set for trial, the defendant 
is ready to proceed, and on the day of trial, it's not a timely motion. 
(R118: 40). After more discussion, the court said it did not believe the prosecutor was 
justified in assuming that the blood result would be admissible just because no motion to 
suppress was filed prior to trial (Rl 18:50,55). The court opined that, unlike other evidence, 
an involuntary blood draw implicates "due process and self-incrimination—or involuntary 
incrimination because a defendant has the right to refuse to give a blood test in a DUI case" 
(Rl 18: 49). Nevertheless, the court did not fault the prosecutor: 
It's not apportionment of blame. I understand. Ms. Beaton, you're one of the 
finest prosecutors that I've ever seen, you really are... . You just are a very 
diligent prosecutor. And I want you to know that there's no blame here, it's 
just something that unfortunately you weren't prepared to deal with today and 
I - you're one of the most thorough prosecutors. And I understand the 
problem here, you assumed something that perhaps shouldn't have been 
assumed. But anybody that's been a prosecutor or a defense attorney runs into 
these kinds of things and so it's certainly not a fault issue. 
It's a matter of I've got a jury here ready to try the case, we've got a 
defendant here ready to be tried, he's got a right to have a speedy, public trial 
and this date was the date set for a trial and both sides have to come prepared. 
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— and you assumed that [defendant] had the burden to raise [his challenge to 
the blood result] and I'm saying, no, he can object to it at trial. That's really 
where that problem arises He could be silent about it even, you know. He 
doesn't have that burden. 
(Rl 18: 50-51). See Add. C. 
When the prosecutor characterized defendant's objection as a motion to suppress, the 
court explained: 
Well, when I learned about it [defense counsel] wasn't saying he was going to 
move to suppress it, he was just going to object to it. It's the same thing as all 
[sic] practical matter. He's just going to object to its admissibility at trial. He 
loves all the facts surrounding it coming in so he wanted all of those things as 
part of his strategy. 
(Rl 18:52). See also R. 118:7,11,17-18,26,46-47. The prosecutor again asked if the court 
was finding a speedy trial violation and the court again said, "No, that's not—that's not the 
issue" (Rl 18: 53). The court was adding "with prejudice" to its dismissal order because the 
prosecutor was unreasonable in asking for a dismissal just "because I am not giving you time 
to address that one issue" (Rl 18: 56). See Add. C. 
Trial Court's Formal Order of Dismissal 
On December 30, 2004, the court entered a formal order of dismissal with prejudice 
(R. 88-99). See Addendum B (Findings and Order of Dismissal With Prejudice). The court 
found that even before trial, the prosecutor caused substantial delays by (1) failing to provide 
defendant with the videotape of his arrest and (2) due to her busy trial calendar (R. 94-95). 
The court called the prosecutor's refusal to proceed on December 15 a "mere whim" in that 
she never provided an explanation for her refusal to proceed other than "she did not expect 
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the defendant to object to the test results being admitted" (R. 92-93 & 95). The court claimed 
that by not being prepared, the prosecutor "made a basic mistake recognized by even 
inexperienced prosecutors by assuming the Court would allow the admissibility of any blood 
test without proper foundation in a DUI case" (R. 96). The prosecutor then "aggravated] 
the situation" by refusing to proceed on the non-DUI charges" for "no reason" (R. 95-96). 
The court characterized the prosecutor's actions as "grossly misdirected and abusive of the 
criminal justice system" in that she deliberately attempted to "unjustifiably delay the trial and 
hamper the defendant in bringing the matter to a resolution" (R. 96). In essence, the 
prosecutor "wanted everyone else to jump out of her way and give in to her whims" (id.) Her 
conduct amounted to "a deliberate unjustified manipulative attempt by the prosecutor to 
delay the trial in order to prevent the case from being tried as scheduled and preventing the 
defendant from having this case resolved speedily" (R. 97). 
The court found that the defense had "from the very beginning of this case requested 
the Court to set hearings and the trial at the earliest possible dates" (R. 97). Moreover, 
defendant "did not waive his right to a speedy trial" and "has fully preserved his right to a 
speedy trial" by "consistently requesting a speedy disposition" (id.). During the December 
15 proceeding, defense counsel established "the hardship, expenses and emotional drain" a 
trial continuance would cause defendant (R. 96). If the trial had been continued to the 
alternate trial date in February, the court presumed that defendant would have suffered 
"tremendous emotional upset" (R. 98). Moreover, by unreasonably refusing to proceed, the 
prosecutor caused defendant a "substantial financial burden," which amounted "to a taking 
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of his material means without justification or due process" (R. 98). The trial court found that 
the prosecutor's "inexcusable" actions violated defendant's speedy trial right and dismissed 
with prejudice (R. 96 & 99). The State timely appealed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts of defendant's offenses are only minimally relevant to this appeal. In sum, 
Trooper Kris Jones observed defendant pull out of a parking lot into the center lane of a two-
lane street, which was "obviously a traffic violation" (Rl 16:17-22). The trooper made a U-
turn and pursued defendant, who was driving about 40 mph, a rate about 10 mph "faster then 
normal traffic" on the roadway (Rl 16: 23-25, 34 & 36). The trooper observed defendant 
commit another improper lane change (Rl 16: 25). 
The trooper turned on his vehicle's emergency lights, overhead strobes, side strobes 
and "wig-wag" lights, which made his vehicle look "pretty much... like a Christmas tree" 
(Rl 16: 31-33). Defendant ignored the trooper (Rl 16: 33). The trooper turned on his siren, 
but defendant ignored him and continued down the road (Rl 16: 33). 
Defendant failed to stop at a stop sign (Rl 16: 35). The trooper was concerned that 
defendant would also not stop at a red light at the next intersection and used a PIT (pursuit 
intervention technique) to stop defendant's vehicle by pushing it into the curb (Rl 16: 3 7-40). 
Defendant was not injured by the maneuver (Rl 16: 41). 
Defendant refused a breath test (R. 8-9; Rl 18: 5, 44-45). After the trooper learned 
that defendant had six previous DUI convictions, he requested and presumptively received 
departmental authorization for an involuntary blood draw (id.). When the draw was made, 
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defendant stuck out his arm for the test and no physical struggle ensued (Rl 18:44-45). The 
blood test revealed an alcohol level of 0.16 grams by weight (Rl 18: 46).6 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A trial court has limited authority to dismiss a felony information with prejudice. 
Here, the court had no authority to dismiss with prejudice because the prosecutor's actions 
did not cause unconstitutional trial delay. 
The sequence of events began when defendant failed to timely raise a challenge to the 
admissibility of his involuntary blood draw. Notwithstanding defendant's failure, the trial 
court opined that a pretrial evidentiary hearing was mandated and gave the prosecutor only 
minutes to prepare for the suppression hearing. The prosecutor was not prepared to proceed 
due to the unavailability of a witness and moved for a continuance. When that was denied, 
the prosecutor moved for a dismissal of the information subject to its refiling. The trial court 
abused its discretion in denying both motions. 
Even assuming arguendo that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 
prosecutor's motions, the court nevertheless abused its authority when it dismissed the 
information with prejudice. A dismissal without prejudice may be a sanction against a 
prosecutor when no reasonable alternative exists, but it is rarely an appropriate remedy. A 
dismissal with prejudice is permissible only when the trial court finds unconstitutional delay 
or a violation of the statute of limitations. Here, the trial court found unconstitutional trial 
6Though blood and urine samples were taken, the discussions below only referred 
to the blood draw (R. 8-9). 
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delay. The record, including the court's oral pronouncements on the morning of trial, does 
not support the court's finding. The trial court, therefore, had no authority to dismiss the 
information with prejudice. This Court should reverse the dismissal, reinstate the 
information, and remand the case for trial. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURTS FINDING OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL DELAY IS 
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS; CONSEQUENTLY, THE TRIAL COURT HAD 
NO AUTHORITY TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE THE FELONY 
INFORMATION 
A trial court may dismiss an information prior to trial for "substantial cause and in 
furtherance of justice"; but the prosecutor retains the discretion to refile the dismissed 
information. See Utah R. Crim. P. 25(a) & (d) (establishing when an information may be 
dismissed prior to trial) (West 2004); Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-7 (West 2004) (same).7 See 
also Utah Code Ann. § 77-2-1 (West 2004) & Utah R. Crim. Proc. 5 (both requiring a 
prosecuting attorney's authorization for a felony or class A misdemeanor). See Addendum 
A (Statutes and Rules). 
If, however, the trial court finds "[t]here is unreasonable or unconstitutional delay in 
bringing a defendant to trial," dismissal of the information is mandated. Utah R. Crim. P. 
25(b). If the delay is only "unreasonable," the dismissal is without prejudice and the 
information may be refiled. Utah R. Crim. P. 25(d). If, on the other hand, the delay is found 
7Rule 25 and section 77-1-7 both address the pretrial dismissal of an information, 
but rule 25 does so with more detail. See Add. A. Here, reference will only be to the rule, 
consistent with the trial court's order. 
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to be "unconstitutional," that is, a violation of the defendant's constitutional right to a speedy 
trial, the dismissal is with prejudice and further prosecution of the charged offenses is barred. 
Id. See also Salt Lake City v. Dorman-Ligh, 912 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah App. 1996). In this 
case, the trial court found unconstitutional delay in bringing defendant to trial and dismissed 
with prejudice the multi-felony information. See Addendum B (Findings and Order of 
Dismissal with Prejudice). 
The sequence of events which culminated in the dismissal began when defendant 
failed to timely challenge the admission of his involuntary blood draw by September 1, as 
directed by the court, or at least five days prior to trial, as dictated by rule 12, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. See R. 33-34 (directing defendant to file any motions to suppress 
evidence by September 1,2004); Utah R. Crim. P. 12(c) & (f)(requiring a motion to suppress 
evidence to be filed at least five days prior to trial or the objection is waived). See Add. A. 
Because defendant failed to challenge the admissibility of the involuntary blood draw, the 
prosecutor correctly believed that the issue of its constitutionality was waived (Rl 18:3 8-3 9). 
She assumed that she only needed to establish the test's evidentiary foundation to admit the 
evidence at trial (Rl 18: 50). 
Instead, prior to jury selection, the trial court learned that defendant intended to object 
to the blood test mid-trial (Rl 18: 5-6). As a matter of strategy, defendant wanted all the 
circumstances surrounding the draw introduced into evidence to support of his theory of 
police misconduct (Rl 18: 7,11,17-18,26,46-47,52). Defendant then planned to object to 
the test result in front of the jury and to argue that the jury could find the test inadmissible 
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as a "matter of fact" (Rl 18: 5, 11-12, 26-27, 47). Properly, the trial court refused to allow 
defendant to proceed in this fashion (R118: 8).8 Improperly, the court set an immediate 
evidentiary hearing on what the court agreed was essentially a motion to suppress the draw 
(R118: 7-10, 29). See discussion, infra. According to the court, it made no difference 
whether defendant complied with rule 12f s timeliness requirement because even if defendant 
was "silent," the court was obligated to make an initial determination of the constitutional 
admissibility of the blood draw before it could be admitted into evidence (Rl 18: 49-51). 
The prosecutor was not prepared to proceed with an unnoticed on-the-spot 
suppression hearing. A witness critical to the hearing, but not otherwise a trial witness, was 
not available. Additionally, because she had no prior notice, the prosecutor was not 
prepared—in the minutes given her—to address legal issues which defendant had yet to 
articulate and the court, by its own admission, needed time to study (Rl 18: 9-10,22,30,3 5-
36,41,49). Reasonably, the prosecutor sought a continuance, which was denied (Rl 18:36). 
The prosecutor then asked that the felony information be dismissed subject to refiling (Rl 18 : 
30,42, 38-49). The court refused and dismissed with prejudice because "the case has been 
set for trial, the defendant is ready to proceed, and on the day of trial, it's not a timely 
motion" (R118: 40). See Addendum C (Transcript of December 15 Proceeding). 
Subsequently, in its formal order of dismissal with prejudice, the court found unconstitutional 
delay caused by the prosecutor's "deliberate unjustified manipulative attempt... to delay 
*See Utah R. Evid. 103(c) (directing that objections challenging the admissibility 
of evidence should be raised outside the presence of the jury); Utah R. Evid. 104(a) 
(recognizing that court determines the admissibility of evidence). 
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trial in order to prevent the case from being tried as scheduled and preventing the defendant 
from having his case resolved speedily" (R. 97). See Add. B. 
As will be discussed, the court abused its discretion in setting an immediate hearing 
and in denying the prosecutor's request for a continuance. But even if these rulings were 
proper, the trial court abused its discretion and exceeded its authority in barring further 
prosecution. A dismissal with prejudice is a draconian remedy which is permissible only 
when a trial court finds an unconstitutional denial of a defendant's right to a speedy trial or 
a violation of the statute of limitations. See Utah R. Crim. P. 25(d). Because the record 
establishes that no unconstitutional delay occurred here, the trial court exceeded its authority 
in dismissing the information with prejudice—an action which turned the right to a speedy 
trial from "a shield against oppression" into "a sword . . . to decapitate the processes of 
justice." State v. Hafen, 593 P.2d 538, 541 (Utah 1979). 
A. The trial court erred in requiring a preliminary inquiry into the 
constitutional admissibility of the blood draw. 
The trial court found that the prosecutor had no reason to assume that defendant would 
not object to the admissibility of the blood draw at trial simply because he failed to move to 
suppress the evidence pretrial (R. 95). According to the court, defendant could remain silent 
and the prosecutor would still be obligated to establish the "proper foundation" for a blood 
test in a DUI (R. 96; Rl 18: 49-51). 
The court explained what it considered "proper foundation." According to the court, 
an involuntary blood draw was different than other evidence: 
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Well, it's a constitutional violation of the defendant's rights in a DUI case 
possibility, although I ha ven't fully researched it myself and would be 
prepared to rule on that within an hour or so, but it just comes to my mind that 
there's a constitutional issue of due process and self-incrimination - or 
involuntary incrimination when a defendant has a right to refuse to give a 
blood test in a DUI case and suffer certain consequences as a result of that 
because the procedures are established on how it is to be done. But again, that 
is what initially comes to my mind about this at least addressing the 
constitutional questions of a defendant's right to due process and the 
incrimination against his own desires similar to any other incrimination. 
For example, I - I read the law as being different in a DUI case than 
someone who is convicted of a crime who has to give a test for DNA samples 
because there are statutory provisions governing the one and the other as well. 
I think there are statutory provisions on voluntary testing in DUI cases, and the 
exception would have to be persuasive, you know, for any court I think to 
allow it in. 
(R118: 49). Accordingly, unless defendant affirmatively stipulated to the draw's 
admissibility, the court believed it was obligated—irrespective of defendant's objection—to 
make an initial determination of the draw's constitutional admissibility before allowing it into 
evidence (Rl 18: 15,49-51). 
The trial court erred when it stated that the admission of an involuntary blood draw 
is subject to special statutory admissibility requirements. To the contrary, even when an 
involuntary blood draw is obtained in violation of agency policy, it is admissible unless 
"prohibited by Rules of Evidence or the constitution." See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-
44.5(l)(b) (West 2004) {Add. A). See also State v. Garcia, 965 P.2d 508, 515 (Utah App. 
1998) (concluding that non-compliance with agency regulations does not prevent the 
admission of a blood draw, but "precludes the State from invoking the statutory presumption 
of the test's validity"). 
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The court also significantly erred in ruling that an involuntary blood draw implicates 
due process and the right against self-incrimination. The United States Supreme rejected this 
argument over forty years ago. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,759-61 (1966) 
(holding that an involuntary blood draw does not violate due process or the right against self-
incrimination). Accord State v. Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198, ffif 12-14, 93 P.3d 854, cert 
granted on other grounds, 100 P.3d 220 (Utah 2004). An involuntary blood draw implicates 
only the Fourth Amendment. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768; Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198, 
fflf 13-14. Because an involuntary taking constitutes a search and seizure, the taking must be 
supported by probable cause and obtained though reasonable means and pursuant to a 
warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71. See 
also Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198, \ 14 (exigency); State v. Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285,292-
93 (Utah App. 1998) (consent), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999). 
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the introduction of an involuntary blood draw 
involves no different constitutional pre-requisite than any other Fourth Amendment seizure. 
See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768; Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198, ffl[ 13-16. If a defendant 
intends to challenge the admission of an involuntary blood draw, he must provide timely 
notice to the prosecution by filing a motion to suppress at least five days before trial or as 
otherwise set by the court. See Utah R. Crim. P. 12(c)(1)(B) (Add. A). If a defendant fails 
to timely file a motion to suppress, the challenge to the admissibility of the blood draw is 
waived. See Utah R. Crim. P. 12(f). See also State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 
1985) ("the failure to assert a particular ground in a pre-trial suppression motion operates as 
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a waiver of the right to challenge the subsequent admission of evidence on that ground") 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Once a constitutional objection to a blood draw is waived, a prosecutor need only 
establish the test's evidentiary foundation for it to be admissible at trial. Cf. Garcia, 965 
P.2d at 515 (recognizing that a chemical test is admissible in a DUI prosecution subject to 
"traditional foundational requirements"); Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.5(l)(b) (recognizing that 
a blood test is admissible in a DUI prosecution if not "prohibited by Rules of Evidence and 
the constitution"). 
Here, defendant strategically chose not to file a motion to suppress the blood draw or 
its result (R118: 7, 11, 17-18, 26, 46-47, 52). A strategic decision precludes a trial court 
from finding "cause" to excuse the late challenge pursuant to rule 12(f). See Davis v. United 
States, 411 U.S. 233, 241 (1973) (recognizing that strong enforcement of waiver rule 
precludes invited error); State v. Tuttle, 399 P.2d 580, 582 (Utah 1965) (same). See also In 
Re General Determination of Rights to the Use of Water, 2004 UT 106, \ 43,110 P.3d 666 
(defining "good cause" to excuse a late filing as "special circumstances essentially beyond 
a party's control"). Consequently, if defendant's failure to timely move to suppress cannot 
be excused pursuant to rule 12, it also cannot be ignored. Yet, here, that is what the trial 
court did (Rl 18: 7-10, 30-31). This was error. 
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B. The trial court abused its discretion in denying the prosecutor's 
request for a continuance. 
The trial court's misconception of the constitutional character of an involuntary blood 
draw underlaid its insistence that a suppression hearing be conducted and no continuance 
permitted. The court's decision was abusive and its underlying findings are clearly 
erroneous. 
In its written findings, the court claimed that the prosecutor was accorded a 
"substantial recess" before being ordered to proceed with the evidentiary hearing (R. 90). 
The finding is clearly erroneous. 
The marshaled evidence establishes that before the jury selection, the parties met in 
chambers and began an extended discussion of the admissibility of defendant's prior 
convictions and ultimately of the involuntary blood draw (Rl 18; 5-30). At 9:45 a.m., the 
court announced that it would excuse the jurors until 1:30 p.m. and, in the interim, 
"immediately" conduct an evidentiary hearing on the constitutional admissibility of the blood 
draw (Rl 18:29-30). The court went back into court, addressed the jurors, and then excused 
the jurors until 1:30 p.m. (Rl 18:31). The court asked the prosecutor if she needed "a few 
more minutes to gather things together and be ready to proceed with the evidentiary hearing" 
(R. 32). The prosecutor responded that she "need[ed] more than a few minutes" (R. 32-33). 
More argument about the evidentiary hearing ensued (Rl 18: 33-34). The prosecutor again 
objected to proceeding when she had "not even been given 10 minutes to talk to [her] 
officers" (R. 34). The court said it would take a 15-minute break and immediately begin the 
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evidentiary hearing (Rl 18: 34). At the conclusion of the recess, the prosecutor moved for 
a continuance rather than proceed with the hearing (Rl 18: 35-36). 
From the transcript, the actual length of the announced recess cannot be determined. 
But the exact length of the recess is immaterial to the question of abuse. For what ever 
minutes the prosecutor was given to prepare, the fact remains that the court ordered an 
unnoticed on-the-spot evidentiary hearing on a dispositve motion in a felony case, which 
issue had been waived when defendant failed to timely raise it. Rule 12 is designed to avoid 
this type of hearing "by ambush" by requiring timely written notice of a constitutional 
challenge. Here, that did not happen. In sum, the marshaled facts do not support that the 
court fairly allowed the prosecutor a reasonable time to prepare for the evidentiary hearing. 
The trial court also clearly erred when it denied the prosecutor's request for a 
continuance because her motion was "untimely" (R. 90). Certainly, a motion to continue the 
morning of a jury trial is disfavored. But, here, the reasoning behind finding is circular. For 
even if, as the court asserts, the prosecutor should have anticipated a constitutional challenge, 
a hearing on the challenge was not discussed or set until that morning (Rl 18:29,36). Within 
minutes of the hearing be set, the prosecutor moved for a continuance (id.). Consequently, 
because the marshaled evidence establishes that the request for continuance was 
contemporaneous with the setting of the hearing, the motion clearly was not untimely. 
The most egregious error the court committed in denying the request for a continuance 
was in characterizing the request as a "whim" (R. 93, 96). No record facts support this 
finding. Instead, the marshaled facts establish only the finding's clear error. 
24 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The marshaled facts establish that when the court set the on-the-spot hearing, the 
prosecutor did not have and could not obtain a critical witness who was not under subpoena 
and was traveling out-of-state (R118: 30). The unavailability of a witness is uniformly 
considered a valid reason for trial delay. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531 (1972). 
Accord State v. Trafny, 799 P.2d 704, 708 n.14 (Utah 1990) (u[t]he absence of necessary 
and vital witnesses has been deemed a valid reason for delay by the State if the witnesses 
would be available within a reasonable time") (citations omitted). See also State v. Mathis, 
319 P.2d 134,136 (Utah 1957) ("[w]here there is some reasonable basis for the request [for 
a continuance] it should not be denied merely because it may work some inconvenience to 
the other party"). 
In erroneously finding that the prosecutor was acting on a "whim" in opposing the 
unnoticed hearing, the court also clearly erred in finding that she provided "no reason" for 
not proceeding. Again, no evidence supports this finding; the marshaled facts only support 
its clear error. 
The marshaled facts establish that the prosecutor objected to the sua sponte 
evidentiary inquiry into the constitutionality of the blood draw. Citing Rodriguez and rule 
12, the prosecutor argued that defendant was the one obligated to challenge the evidence by 
timely moving to suppress it (Rl 18: 24-25, 35-36). Because defendant failed to do so, the 
prosecutor argued that the constitutional challenge was waived and no suppression hearing 
was necessary (Rl 18:24-25). This prosecutor's position was not a whim, but based on Utah 
rule and precedent. 
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The marshaled facts further show that the prosecutor explained that she could not 
proceed with the evidentiary hearing because the necessary witness was unavailable (Rl 18: 
30). The court offered to relax the hearsay rules to minimize the problem, but the prosecutor 
responded that her trial witnesses did not know the basis for the sergeant's authorization of 
the blood draw (id.). The prosecutor further explained that if she was compelled to proceed 
without her witness and the blood test was suppressed, the State's right to appeal the adverse 
ruling would effectively be lost because trial would commence immediately (Rl 18:41). See 
State v. Troyer, 866 P.2d 528,531 (Utah 1993) (recognizing that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18a-l (West 2004), the State may directly appeal the suppression of evidence when it 
results in the dismissal of the charge). The prosecutor's concerns were not a whim, but a 
reasonable view of the facts and law. 
The prosecutor continued with her reasons. She explained that even though the court 
offered to sever the charges, severance would not help the State (R118: 53-55). The 
prosecutor considered the charges to be part of the same single criminal episode (id.). See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 (West 2004) (defining "single criminal episode" as including 
"all conduct which is closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or an 
accomplishment of the same criminal objective"). If the charges were severed and the 
prosecutor proceeded to trial on the non-DUI charges, j eopardy would attach (Rl 18: 5 5). If 
the prosecutor then attempted to try the severed DUI charge, prosecution would likely be 
barred by double jeopardy and/or the single criminal episode statute (id.). The prosecutor's 
concerns were reasonable. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-402 & 403 (West 2004) (barring 
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separate prosecutions for crimes included in the same criminal episode). See also State v. 
Harris, 2004 UT 103, \ 24 n.6, 104 P.3d 1250 (encouraging trial courts to be "mindful" of 
the single criminal episode provisions to avoid double jeopardy bar). 
The trial court summarily rejected the prosecutor's concerns (R118: 55). In its 
subsequent findings, the court found that the prosecutor never offered any explanation: "The 
Court encouraged [the prosecutor] to try the other three charges while the jury was available. 
She refused. She gave no reason." (R. 90). Because the marshaled evidence does not 
support this finding, it is clearly erroneous. 
Similarly, the court later maligned the prosecutor in its formal findings and claimed 
that her "mistaken" assumptions were ones that even an "inexperienced" prosecutor would 
not make (R. 96). However, on December 15, the court said exactly the opposite when it 
praised the prosecutor's competency and diligence: 
It's not apportionment of blame You're one of the finest prosecutors that 
I've ever seen . . . Your just are a very diligent prosecutor.... But anybody 
that's been a prosecutor or a defense attorney runs into these kinds of things 
and so it's certainly not a fault issue. 
(R118: 50). See full quotation, supra at 11. The marshaled evidence supports the court's 
oral finding made on December 15. See Statement of the Case, supra. No facts support the 
court's subsequent written lambast of the prosecutor—except for the fact that she was not 
prepared to argue a waived constitutional issue on the morning of trial. 
But anger at the prosecutor—justified or not—rarely warrants the disassembling of 
a felony prosecution. See Dorman-Ligh, 912 P.2d at 456 ("[dismissal of a criminal 
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information as a sanction against the prosecutor is rarely appropriate, even if the prosecutor 
is in contempt of court). See also State v. Ruffin, 853 A.2d 311, 322 (N.J. 2004) 
(recognizing that courts exist to do justice and "[n]o eagerness to expedite business, or to 
utilize fully the court's time, should be permitted to interfere with our high duty of 
administrating justice in the individual case"); State v. Bolen, 13 P.3d 1270, 1274 (Kan. 
2000) ("[dismissal of charges oftentimes punishes the public rather than the prosecutor and 
creates a windfall for the defendant). 
In sum, the marshaled facts do not support the court's findings that the prosecutor was 
unreasonable or untimely in seeking a continuance. Consequently, the court abused its 
discretion in denying the request. 
C The trial court clearly erred in finding a speedy trial violation. 
During the December 15 proceedings, the trial court repeatedly insisted that it was not 
finding a speedy trial violation or assessing fault or blame (Rl 18: 39,49, 50-51). See Add. 
C. Nevertheless, when the court entered its subsequent formal findings, it found that the 
prosecutor's actions amounted to "a deliberate unjustified manipulative attempt... to delay 
trial in order to prevent the case from being tried as scheduled and preventing the defendant 
from having his case resolved speedily" (R. 97). See Add. B. The court attributed the 
discovery and other hearing delays to a lack of diligence by the prosecutor (R. 95-97). In 
contrast, the court found that defendant consistently asserted his right to a speedy trial and 
endeavored to proceed expeditiously (R. 97). The court found that defendant established that 
he would suffer substantial emotional harm if the December trial were continued (R. 98). The 
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court also found that the financial costs incurred by defendant as a result of the prosecutor's 
allegedly dilatory tactics amounted to a "taking"without the benefit of due process (R. 98-
99). The court relied on these subsidiary findings to ultimately find unconstitutional delay 
(R. 99). The court's findings are without evidentiary support and, consequently, amount to 
clear error. Each will discussed in the context of the speedy trial analysis. 
As previously discussed, in this case, the information could only be dismissed with 
prejudice if the court found unconstitutional delay, that is, if it found that defendant's right 
to a speedy trial was violated. See Utah R. Crim. P. 25(d). See discussion, supra. Speedy 
trial analysis is guided by a four-part balancing test, which focuses on (a) the length of the 
delay, (b) the reasons for the delay, (c) whether defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, 
and (d) whether defendant suffered prejudice from the delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530; 
Trafny, 799 P.2d at 706. In making this ad hoc determination, the trial court must consider 
all relevant facts, but no single factor controls. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. Moreover, "[u]ntil 
there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into 
the other factors that go into the balance." Id. Accord Trafny, 799 P.2d at 706. 
Length of Delay, No precise number of days establish unconstitutional delay. 
Barker, 407 U.S. at 521-22. Even a delay of 4 V2 years between arrest and trial may not 
constitute a violation. See Trafny, 799 P.2d at 708 n.16; State v. Ossana, 739 P.2d 628,632 
(Utah 1987). Here, ten months passed between arrest and dismissal; if the trial had been 
continued to February, twelve months would have passed. See Statement of the Case. 
During that period, defendant was incarcerated only 8 days (R. 1-2, 19). 
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The trial court found that a one-year delay was "substantial," but not presumptively 
unconstitutional (R. 94-95). The court, however, attributed blame to the prosecutor (id.) 
According to the court, the prosecutor significantly delayed discovery, often had a conflicting 
court calendar, and on December 15, provided no reason for the requested trial continuance 
(R. 88, 90). On the other hand, the court found defendant blameless, noting that defendant 
consistently sought early hearings and trial settings and consistently invoked his right to a 
speedy trial (R. 97-99). 
The marshaled evidence supports that approximately one month elapsed before 
defendant received a copy of the tape he requested through discovery (R. 21-22,25-26). The 
record facts do not support that the prosecutor necessarily caused the delay. 
The marshaled evidence establishes that defendant wanted a copy of the trooper's 
videotape of defendant's arrest to assist defendant in preparing for trial (R. 21-22). Though 
the tape was not necessary for the preliminary hearing, he twice asked for a continuance of 
the preliminary hearing because he did not have the tape (Rl 16:4-6).9 The first time defense 
counsel asked for the tape was only two working days before the scheduled hearing on March 
1 (R. 15-16, 21-22). When the tape was not available, defense counsel did not blame the 
prosecutor, but told the magistrate that "maybe the request went to the wrong place or 
9
 See Utah R. Crim. 7(i)(2) ("[objections to evidence on the ground that it was 
acquired by unlawful means are not properly raised at the preliminary examination"). 
Defendant did subsequently use the tape during the October suppression hearing when he 
challenged the legality of the stop (R116: 48-52). 
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something" (Rl 16: 4).10 On March 4, the court ordered a copy of the Highway Patrol tape 
released to the defense (R. 21-22). On March 29, defendant said that he still did not have the 
tape, but implied that he expected to receive it soon (Rl 16: 5-6). Again, defense counsel 
attributed no blame to the prosecutor (id.). Defense counsel told the court that even though 
they could proceed with the preliminary hearing in two weeks, he needed a five-week 
continuance because of his own schedule (Rl 16: 5). In seeking this continuance, defense 
counsel "waived any speedy trial requirements that might fall in there" (id.). 
The marshaled facts establish only that it took approximately one month for defendant 
to receive a tape of his own arrest. The record does not establish if the tape, created by the 
Highway Patrol trooper, was actually in the prosecutor's possession or still under agency 
control (R. 21-22; R116: 4-5, 48-50). While a prosecutor is ultimately responsible for 
complying with a discovery order pursuant to rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the 
marshaled facts negate any suggestion that defense counsel blamed the prosecutor for the 
delay or that the prosecutor intentionally caused the delay. 
The court similarly found that the prosecutor's busy calendar contributed to the length 
of the pretrial delays and opined that "for some reason, Ms. Beaton's trial calendar seems to 
be more crowded that [sic] any other prosecutor's calender, as she more frequently rejects 
trial dates suggested by the Court than do other prosecutors" (R. 94). There is no marshaled 
evidence to support this claim. The record reveals no time when the prosecutor's calendar 
created a delay for defendant. 
I0Presumptively, the request was made to the Highway Patrol (Rl 16: 4-5, 48-50). 
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In connection with the trial court's multiple findings alleging delays caused by the 
prosecutor, the marshaled evidence establishes that the prosecutor was ready to proceed with 
preliminary hearing on March 1, on March 29, and on May 3—all dates which defendant 
continued or stipulated to the continuance.11 See Statement of the Case. The prosecutor was 
not ready to proceed on July 12 because a witness was not available and asked for a one-
week continuance (R. 105-08; Rl 16: 12). Defendant not only did not object, but asked for 
the continuance to be extended one month (R. 31-33; Rl 16: 12). See Ossana, 739 P.2d at 
632; State v. Snyder, 932 P.2d 120, 130 (Utah App. 1997) (both recognizing that a 
defendant's failure to object to delays negates a finding of a speedy trial violation). 
When the December trial date was set, the prosecutor readily accepted that date and 
responded, "[t]he sooner the better" (Rl 16:68). The prosecutor's eagerness to proceed with 
trial is consistent with the court's own in-court observation that the prosecutor was "very 
diligent," which observation contradicts the court's subsequent written finding that the 
prosecutor was derelict and difficult to schedule (R. 94-95; Rl 18: 50-51). 
In sum, the marshaled evidence support that discovery of the tape was delayed by one 
month. Given the limited scope of a preliminary hearing, see n.9, supra, the record does not 
establish why the delay in receiving the tape necessarily impacted the scheduling of the 
preliminary hearing, but for defense counsel's preference to have the tape before proceeding. 
The marshaled evidence further supports that the prosecutor sought a one-week continuance 
11
 The prosecutor was ready to proceed on May 3, but agreed to the continuance to 
determine if defendant would be facing additional charges (Rl 16:7). 
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of the preliminary hearing. No other delays—until December 15—are attributable to the 
prosecutor. See discussion, infra. 
Reasons for Delay and Defendant's Assertion of His Speedy Trial Right. "The 
conduct of both the prosecutor and the defendant are weighed" in a speedy trial 
determination. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. See Ossana, 739 P.2d at 632. "Delays caused by 
the defendant will not be counted against the State and will weigh against the defendant in 
considering the totality of the circumstances." Trafny, 799 P.2d at 708 n. 15. See also State 
v. Hoyt, 806 P.2d 204, 208 (Utah 1999) (same). Moreover, the unavailability of a witness 
is uniformly recognized as a valid reason for delay. See id. at n.14. See also Barker, 407 
U.S. at 531; Hoyt, 806 P.2d at 208. 
When the trial court addressed Barker's second and third factors, it focused 
exclusively on the prosecutor's refusal to proceed on December 15 (R. 94-95). The trial 
court found that the prosecutor provided no reason for her refusal to proceed (R. 90-91 & 95-
96). As previously discussed, this finding is clearly erroneous. See discussion, supra. 
The trial court only minimally addressed the reasons for defendant's requested delays 
(R. 95-97). The court acknowledged that defendant's motion to suppress the illegal stop 
delayed the proceedings, but did not consider that the period of the delay occasioned by 
defendant's motion (September 8 to October 18) was nearly identical in length to the 
continuance the prosecutor sought on the day of trial (December 15 to February 3) (R. 36-37; 
R116:65). 
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The trial court found that "[djefendant and his attorney have from the very beginning 
of this requested the Court to set hearings and the trial at the earliest possible dates" (R. 97). 
The court also found that "defendant has consistently requested a speedy disposition of his 
case and objected to any further delays" (R. 99). Again, these findings are clearly erroneous. 
There is no evidence that defendant asserted his speedy trial right or requested an early 
disposition of his case prior to December 15. Indeed, defendant's actions before December 
15 belie an assertion of the right. 
The marshaled evidence establishes that defendant freely sought continuances for a 
variety of reasons and often for periods beyond what appeared necessary or sought by the 
prosecutor. On March 1, he asked for a continuance because he wanted the trooper's 
videotape, but admitted that he probably sent the request to the wrong place (Rl 16: 4). On 
March 29, defense counsel asked for a five-week continuance and affirmatively "waived any 
speedy trial requirements that might fall in there" to obtain a continuance because "that's 
spring break and I'm afraid it conflicts with my schedule" (Rl 16: 5). On May 3, the parties 
jointly asked for a continuance to see if a new charge would be filed and defendant asked that 
the continuance be for one month (Rl 16: 7-8). On June 7, defense counsel asked for a five-
week continuance because of "Scout Camp and other commitments" (Rl 16:10). On July 
12, the prosecutor asked for a one-week continuance because a witness was unavailable 
(Rl 16:12). Defendant had no objection and expanded the continuance to one month (Rl 16: 
12). When trial was scheduled for on a second setting for December 15, defendant voiced 
no objection and only asked for a firm alternate setting on February 3 (Rl 16: 67, 70-71). 
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And in a pretrial conference on December 6, defense counsel casually warned that he might 
need a continuance of the scheduled trial because he subpoenaed the "wrong information" 
from the Highway Patrol and planned on re-subpoenaing the agency (Rl 16: 75-76). 
The fact that defendant continued these pretrial hearings is not unusual or necessarily 
inappropriate. But neither were the prosecutor's more minimal requests. However, 
defendant's own actions negate the court's findings that he aggressively sought the early 
disposition of his case. SeeSnyder, 932P.2dat l30-3l;Hoyt, 806P.2dat208; Ossana, 739 
P.2d at 632. Consequently, the court's findings that defendant only minimally contributed 
to the delays and consistently expressed a desire for a speedy trial are clearly erroneous. 
Prejudice. The record does not support the court's finding of unconstitutional delay. 
The trial court nevertheless proceeded to consider Barker's final factor: whether defendant 
experienced prejudice as a result of the delays (R. 97-99). 
To support a speedy trial violation, prejudice must result from the delay. Barker, 407 
U.S. at 533-54. Enforcement of a speedy trial right raises "three identifiable areas of 
concern: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern 
of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired." Snyder, 
932 P.2d at 130. The concerns found in (i) and (iii) are not at issue in this case. 
In connection with (ii)—anxiety—the trial court found that defendant suffered 
emotional harm from the prosecutor's delays (R. 98). The court presumed that with the 
anticipation of trial, the "build up of emotion for a defendant must be very substantial. Then 
the let down of not having the case finally resolved and necessity of possibility of having to 
35 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
go through all this again, as requested by the prosecutor, must have been a tremendous 
emotional upset to the defendant" (R. 98). According to the court, defense counsel 
"pointe[d] out the hardship, expenses and emotional drain [a continuance] would cause the 
defendant" (R. 96). This finding has no record support and is clearly erroneous. 
The marshaled evidence establishes that defendant made only one claim of prejudice. 
When the prosecutor requested a continuance to the alternate February date, defense counsel 
objected: 
[M]aybe this is just a legend that passes around among the defense bar, but 
most defense attorneys—my brother is a prosecutor and a judge and they, at 
least in Arizona, prosecutors will not try cases during December because they 
believe jurors for the will of the season or whatever it are more lenient. And 
for that matter . . . it would be prejudicial to my client not to have the trial in 
the month of December but to bump it off to when all the debts hit in February. 
(R118: 27). Other than this statement, the record contains no evidence of defendant's 
"distress." 
The record also contains no evidence of costs incurred by defendant, but for the fact 
that he retained private counsel after qualifying for a public defender (R. 11-12, 14). 
Notwithstanding, the trial court speculated that defendant incurred a "substantial unnecessary 
financial burden" because trial did not proceed as scheduled (R. 98). The court found that 
this burden was caused "by the prosecutor's unjustified conduct... [and] amounts to a taking 
of [defendant's] material means without justification or due process" (R. 98). The court's 
finding is clearly erroneous since no evidence supports it. Moreover, to the extent that he 
incurred some costs of representation on December 15, that fact alone does not raise a due 
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process concern. For "due process is not concerned with ordinary levels of inconvenience 
because the nature of the criminal justice system necessarily inconveniences those individuals 
who have been accused of crimes." State v. Morgan, 2001 UT 87, f^ 22, 34 P.3d 767 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
In sum, the trial court's finding of a speedy trial violation is not supported by the 
record facts. At best, the marshaled facts establish that some ordinary delay occurred. But 
"[w]hile diligence in preparation should be insisted upon, the courts necessarily must be 
somewhat indulgent of perplexing situations which arise, to the end that both sides have a 
fair opportunity to present their respective cases." Mathis, 319 P.2d at 136. In this case, that 
result did not occur. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that the Court reverse the 
dismissal with prejudice, reinstate the information, and remand for trial. 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
This Court has discretion "to determine which matters require oral argument, which 
decisions require a full opinion, and which do not." Grand County v. Rogers, 2002 UT 25, 
\16, 44 P.3d 734. Here, the decisional process would be significantly aided by oral 
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argument. Cf. Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3). Therefore, the State requests oral argument. 
Respectfully submitted this j^Y^-day of June, 2005. 
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Attorney General 
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Assistant Attorney General 
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RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
RULE 5. INFORMATION AND INDICTMENT 
(a) Unless otherwise provided, all criminal prosecutions whether for felony, 
misdemeanor or infraction shall be commenced by the filing of an information 
or the return of an indictment. Prosecution by information shall be com-
menced before a magistrate having jurisdiction of the offense alleged to have 
been committed unless otherwise provided by law. 
(b) Unless otherwise provided, no information shall be filed before a magis-
trate charging the commission of a felony or class A misdemeanor unless the 
prosecuting attorney shall first authorize the filing of such information. This 
restriction shall not apply in cases where the magistrate has reasonable cause 
to believe that the person to be charged may avoid apprehension or escape 
before approval can be obtained. 
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RULE 7. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE MAGISTRATE 
(a) When a summons is issued in lieu of a warrant of arrest, the defendant 
shall appear before the court as directed in the summons. 
(b) When any peace officer or other person makes an arrest with or without 
a warrant, the person arrested shall be taken to the nearest available magistrate 
for setting of bail. If an information has not been filed, one shall be filed 
without delay before the magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense. 
(c)(1) In order to detain any person arrested without a warrant, as soon as is 
reasonably feasible but in no event longer than 48 hours after the arrest, a 
determination shall be made as to whether there is probable cause to continue 
to detain the arrestee. The determination may be made by any magistrate, 
although if the arrestee is charged with a capital offense, the magistrate may 
not be a justice court judge. The arrestee need not be present at the probable 
cause determination. 
(c)(2) A written probable cause statement shall be presented to the magis-
trate, although the statement may be verbally communicated by telephone, 
telefaxed, or otherwise electronically transmitted to the magistrate. 
(c)(2)(A) A statement which is verbally communicated by telephone shall be 
reduced to a sworn written statement prior to submitting the probable cause 
issue to the magistrate for decision. The person reading the statement to the 
magistrate shall verify to the magistrate that the person is reading the written 
statement verbatim, and shall write on the statement that person's name and 
title, the date and time of the communication with the magistrate, and the 
determination the magistrate directs to be indicated on the statement. 
(c)(2)(B) If a statement is verbally communicated by telephone, telefaxed, or 
otherwise electronically transmitted, the original statement shall, as soon as 
practicable, be filed with the court where the case will be filed. 
(c)(3) The magistrate shall review the probable cause statement and from it 
determine whether there is probable cause to continue to detain the arrestee. 
(c)(3)(A) If the magistrate finds there is not probable cause to continue to 
detain the arrestee, the magistrate shall order the immediate release of the 
arrestee. 
(c)(3)(B) If the magistrate finds probable cause to continue to detain the 
arrestee, the magistrate shall immediately make a bail determination. The bail 
determination shall coincide with the recommended bail amount in the Uni-
form Fine/Bail Schedule unless the magistrate finds substantial cause to deviate 
from the Schedule. 
(c)(4) The presiding district court judge shall, in consultation with the Justice 
Court Administrator, develop a rotation of magistrates which assures availabili-
ty of magistrates consistent with the need in that particular district. The 
schedule shall take into account the case load of each of the magistrates, their 
location and their willingness to serve. 
(c)(5) Nothing in this subsection (c) is intended to preclude the accomplish-
ment of other procedural processes at the time of the determination referred to 
in paragraph (c)(1) above. 
(d)(1) If a person is arrested in a county other than where the offense was 
committed the person arrested shall without unnecessary delay be returned to 
the county where the crime was committed and shall be taken before the 
proper magistrate under these rules. 
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(d)(2) If for any reason the person arrested cannot be promptly returned to 
the county and the charge against the defendant is a misdemeanor for which a 
voluntary forfeiture of bail may be entered as a conviction under Subsection 
77-7-21(1), the person arrested may statfe in writing a desire to forfeit bail, 
waive trial in the district in which the information is pending, and consent to 
disposition of the case in the county in which the person was arrested, is held, 
or is present. 
(d)(3) Upon receipt of the defendant's statement, the clerk of the court in 
which the information is pending shall transmit the papers in the proceeding or 
copies of them to the clerk of the court for the county in which the defendant is 
arrested, held, or present. The prosecution shall continue in that county. 
(d)(4) Forfeited bail shall be returned to the jurisdiction that issued the 
warrant. 
(d)(5) If the defendant is charged with an offense other than a misdemeanor 
for which a voluntary forfeiture of bail may be entered as a conviction under 
Subsection 77-7-21(1), the defendant shall be taken without unnecessary delay 
before a magistrate within the county of arrest for the determination of bail 
under Section 77-20-1 and released on bail or held without bail under Section 
77-20-1. 
(d)(6) Bail shall be returned to the magistrate having jurisdiction over the 
offense, with the record made of the proceedings before the magistrate. 
(e) The magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense charged shall, upon 
the defendant's first appearance, inform the defendant: 
(e)(1) of the charge in the information or indictment and furnish a copy; 
(e)(2) of any affidavit or recorded testimony given in support of the informa-
tion and how to obtain them; 
(e)(3) of the right to retain counsel or have counsel appointed by the court 
without expense if unable to obtain counsel; 
(e)(4) of rights concerning pretrial release, including bail; and 
(e)(5) that the defendant is not required to make any statement, and that the 
statements the defendant does make may be used against the defendant in a 
court of law. 
(f) The magistrate shall, after providing the information under paragraph (e) 
and before proceeding further, allow the defendant reasonable time and oppor-
tunity to consult counsel and shall allow the defendant to contact any attorney 
by any reasonable means, without delay and without fee. 
(g) If the charge against the defendant is a misdemeanor, the magistrate 
shall call upon the defendant to enter a plea. 
(g)(1) If the plea is guilty, the defendant shall be sentenced by the magistrate 
as provided by law. 
(g)(2) If the plea is not guilty, a trial date shall be set. The date may not be 
extended except for good cause shown. Trial shall be held under these rules 
and law applicable to criminal cases. 
(h)(1) If a defendant is charged with a felony, the defendant shall be advised 
of the right to a preliminary examination. If the defendant waives the right to 
a preliminary examination, and the prosecuting attorney consents, the magis-
trate shall order the defendant bound over to answer in the district court. 
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(h)(2) If the defendant does not waive a preliminary examination, the magis-
trate shall schedule the preliminary examination. The examination shall be 
held within a reasonable time, but not later than ten days if the defendant is in 
custody for the offense charged and not later than 30 days if the defendant is 
not in custody. These time periods may be extended by the magistrate for good 
cause shown. A preliminary examination may not be held if the defendant is 
indicted. 
(i)(l) Unless otherwise provided, a preliminary examination shall be held 
under the rules and laws applicable to criminal cases tried before a court. The 
state has the burden of proof and shall proceed first with its case. At the 
conclusion of the state's case, the defendant may testify under oath, call 
witnesses, and present evidence. The defendant may also cross-examine ad-
verse witnesses. 
(i)(2) If from the evidence a magistrate finds probable cause to believe that 
the crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed 
it, the magistrate shall order that the defendant be bound over to answer in the 
district court. The findings of probable cause may be based on hearsay in 
whole or in part. Objections to evidence on the ground that it was acquired by 
unlawful means are not properly raised at the preliminary examination. 
(i)(3) If the magistrate does not find probable cause to believe that the crime 
charged has been committed or that the defendant committed it, the magistrate 
shall dismiss the information and discharge the defendant. The magistrate may 
enter findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order of dismissal. The 
dismissal and discharge do not preclude the state from instituting a subsequent 
prosecution for the same offense. 
(j) At a preliminary examination, the magistrate, upon request of either 
party, may exclude witnesses from the courtroom and may require witnesses 
not to converse with each other until the preliminary examination is concluded. 
On the request of either party, the magistrate may order all spectators to be 
excluded from the courtroom. 
(k)(l) If the magistrate orders the defendant bound over to the district court, 
the magistrate shall execute in writing a bind-over order and shall transmit to 
the clerk of the district court all pleadings in and records made of the 
proceedings before the magistrate, including exhibits, recordings, and any 
typewritten transcript. 
(k)(2) When a magistrate commits a defendant to the custody of the sheriff, 
the magistrate shall execute the appropriate commitment order. 
(/)(1) When a magistrate has good cause to believe that any material witness 
in a pending case will not appear and testify unless bond is required, the 
magistrate may fix a bond with or without sureties and in a sum considered 
adequate for the appearance of the witness. 
(/ )(2) If the witness fails or refuses to post the bond with the clerk of the 
court, the magistrate may commit the witness to jail until the witness complies 
or is otherwise legally discharged. 
(/ )(3) If the witness does provide bond when required, the witness may be 
examined and cross-examined before the magistrate in the presence of the 
defendant and the testimony shall be recorded. The witness shall then be 
discharged. 
(/)(4) If the witness is unavailable or fails to appear at any subsequent 
hearing or trial when ordered to do so, the recorded testimony may be used at 
the hearing or trial in lieu of the personal testimony of the witness. 
[Amended effective May 1, 1993; November 1, 1996; April 29, 1998- April 1 1999-
April 1, 2004; April 1, 2005.] ' 
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RULE 12. MOTIONS 
(a) Motions. An application to the court for an order shall be by motion, 
which, unless made during a trial or hearing, shall be in writing and in 
accordance with this rule. A motion shall state succinctly and with particulari-
ty the grounds upon which it is made and the relief sought. A motion need not 
be accompanied by a memorandum unless required by the court. 
(b) Request to Submit for Decision. When the time for filing a response to a 
motion and the reply has passed, either party may file a request to submit the 
motion for decision. The request shall be a separate pleading captioned 
''Request to Submit for Decision." The Request to Submit for Decision shall 
state the date on which the motion was served, the date the opposing memoran-
dum, if any, was served, the date the reply memorandum, if any, was served, 
and whether a hearing has been requested. The notification shall contain a 
certificate of mailing to all parties. If no party files a request, the motion will 
not be submitted for decision. 
(c) Time for filing specified motions. Any defense, objection or request, 
including request for rulings on the admissibility of evidence, which is capable 
of determination without the trial of the general issue may be raised prior to 
trial by written motion. 
(c)(1) The following shall be raised at least five days prior to the trial: 
(c)(1)(A) defenses and objections based on defects in the indictment or 
information other than that it fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge 
an offense, which objection shall be noticed by the court at any time during the 
pendency of the proceeding; 
(c)(1)(B) motions to suppress evidence; 
(c)(1)(C) requests for discovery where allowed; 
(c)(1)(D) requests for severance of charges or defendants; or 
(c)(1)(E) motions to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy. 
(c)(2) Motions for a reduction of criminal offense at sentencing pursuant to 
Utah Code Section 76-3-402, shall be in writing and filed at least ten days prior 
to the date of sentencing unless the court sets the date for sentencing within ten 
days of the entry of conviction. Motions for a reduction of criminal offense 
pursuant to Utah Code Section 76-3-402 may be raised at any time after 
sentencing upon proper service of the motion on the appropriate prosecuting 
entity. 
(d) Motions to Suppress. A motion to suppress evidence shall: 
(d)(1) describe the evidence sought to be suppressed; 
(d)(2) set forth the standing of the movant to make the application; and 
(d)(3) specify sufficient legal and factual grounds for the motion to give the 
opposing party reasonable notice of the issues and to enable the court to 
determine what proceedings are appropriate to address them. 
If an evidentiary hearing is requested, no written response to the motion by 
the non-moving party is required, unless the court orders otherwise. At the 
conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the court may provide a reasonable time 
for all parties to respond to the issues of fact and law raised in the motion and 
at the hearing. 
(e) A motion made before trial shall be determined before trial unless the 
court for good cause orders that the ruling be deferred for later determination. 
Where factual issues are involved in determining a motion, the court shall state 
its findings on the record. 
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(f) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to make 
requests which must be made prior to trial or at the time set by the court shall 
constitute waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief from 
such waiver. 
(g) Except in justices' courts, a verbatim record shall be made of all proceed-
ings at the hearing on motions, including such findings of fact and conclusions 
of law as are made orally. 
(h) If the court grants a motion based on a defect in the institution of the 
prosecution or in the indictment or information, it may also order that bail be 
continued for a reasonable and specified time pending the filing of a new 
indictment or information. Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to affect 
provisions of law relating to a statute of limitations. 
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RULE 16. DISCOVERY 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the defense 
upon request the following material or information of which he has knowledge: 
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefendants; 
(2) the criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant; 
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the 
accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the 
offense for reduced punishment; and 
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good cause 
shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the defendant to 
adequately prepare his defense. 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable following 
the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The 
prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure. 
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose 
to the prosecutor such information as required by statute relating to alibi or 
insanity and any other item of evidence which the court determines on good 
cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in order, for the 
prosecutor to adequately prepare his case. 
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall make all disclo-
sures at least ten days before trial or as soon as practicable. He has a 
continuing duty to make disclosure. 
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may 
make disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and information 
may be inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable times and places. 
The prosecutor or defense may impose reasonable limitations on the further 
dissemination of sensitive information otherwise subject to discovery to prevent 
improper use of the information or to protect victims and witnesses from 
harassment, abuse, or undue invasion of privacy, including limitations on the 
further dissemination of videotaped interviews, photographs, or psychological 
or medical reports. 
(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that discovery 
or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, that limitations on the further 
dissemination of discovery be modified or make such other order as is appro-
priate. Upon motion by a party, the court may permit the party to make such 
showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to be inspected 
by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief following such 
an ex parte showing, the entire text of the party's statement shall be sealed and 
preserved in the records of the court to be made available to the appellate court 
in the event of an appeal. 
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the 
attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court 
may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continu-
ance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may 
enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. 
(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the accused may be required to: 
(1) appear in a lineup; 
(2) speak for identification; 
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(3) submit to fingerprinting or the making of other bodily impressions; 
(4) pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the crime; 
(5) try on articles of clothing or other items of disguise; 
(6) permit the taking of samples of blood, hair, fingernail scrapings, and 
other bodily materials which can be obtained without unreasonable intrusion; 
(7) provide specimens of handwriting; 
(8) submit to reasonable physical or medical inspection of his body; and 
(9) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance at the time of 
the alleged offense. 
Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is required for the forego-
ing purposes, reasonable notice of the time and place of such appearance shall 
be given to the accused and his counsel. Failure of the accused to appear or to 
comply with the requirements of this rule, unless relieved by order of the court, 
without reasonable excuse shall be grounds for revocation of pre-trial release, 
may be offered as evidence in the prosecutor's case in chief for consideration 
along with other evidence concerning the guilt of the accused and shall be 
subject to such further sanctions as the court should deem appropriate. 
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R U L E 2 5 . DISMISSAL WITHOUT TRIAL 
(a) In its discretion, for substantial cause and in furtherance of justice, the 
court may, either on its own initiative or upon application of either party, order 
an information or indictment dismissed. 
(b) The court shall dismiss the information or indictment when: 
(1) There is unreasonable or unconstitutional delay in bringing defendant to 
trial; 
(2) The allegations of the information or indictment, together with any bill of 
particulars furnished in support thereof, do not constitute the offense intended 
to be charged in the pleading so filed; 
(3) It appears that there was a substantial and prejudicial defect in the 
impaneling or in the proceedings relating to the grand jury; 
(4) The court is without jurisdiction; or 
(5) The prosecution is barred by the statute of limitations. 
(c) The reasons for any such dismissal shall be set forth in an order and 
entered in the minutes. 
(d) If the dismissal is based upon the grounds that there was unreasonable 
delay, or the court is without jurisdiction, or the offense was not properly 
alleged in the information or indictment, or there was a defect in the impan-
eling or of the proceedings relating to the grand jury, further prosecution for 
the offense shall not be barred and the court may make such orders with 
respect to the custody of the defendant pending the filing of new charges as the 
interest of justice may require. Otherwise the defendant shall be discharged 
and bail exonerated. 
An order of dismissal based upon unconstitutional delay in bringing the 
defendant to trial or based upon the statute of limitations, shall be a bar to any 
other prosecution for the offense charged. 
(e) In misdemeanor cases, upon motion of the prosecutor, the court may 
dismiss the case if it is compromised by the defendant and the injured party. 
The injured party shall first acknowledge the compromise before the court or in 
writing. The reasons for the order shall be set forth therein and entered in the 
minutes. The order shall be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense; 
provided however, that dismissal by compromise shall not be granted when the 
misdemeanor is committed by or upon a peace officer while in the performance 
of his duties, or riotously, or with an intent to commit a felony. 
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Utah Rules of Evidence 
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RULE 103. RULINGS ON EVIDENCE 
(a) Effect of Erroneous Ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling 
which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is 
affected, and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely 
objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of 
objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context; or 
(2) Offer of Proof In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the 
substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was 
apparent from the context within which questions were asked. Once the 
court makes a definitive ruling on the record admitting or excluding evi-
dence, either at or before trial, a party need not renew an objection or offer 
of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal. 
(b) Record of Offer and Ruling. The court may add any other or further 
statement which shows the character of the evidence, the form in which it was 
offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon. It may direct the making 
of an offer in question and answer form. 
(c) Hearing of Jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the 
extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested 
to the jury by any means, such as making statements or offers of proof or 
asking questions in the hearing of the jury. 
(d) Plain Error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors 
affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of 
the court. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RULE 104. PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS 
(a) Questions of Admissibility Generally. Preliminary questions concerning 
the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the 
admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the 
provisions of Subdivision (b). In making its determination it is not bound by 
the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges. 
(b) Relevancy Conditioned on Fact. When the relevancy of evidence de-
pends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, 
or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the 
fulfillment of the condition. 
(c) Hearing of Jury. Hearings on the admissibility of confessions shall in all 
cases be conducted out of the hearing of the jury. Hearings on other prelimi-
nary matters shall be so conducted when the interests of justice require, or 
when an accused is a witness and so requests. 
(d) Testimony by Accused. The accused does not, by testifying upon a 
preliminary matter, become subject to cross-examination as to other issues in 
the case. 
(e) Weight and Credibility. This rule does not limit the right of a party to 
introduce before the jury evidence relevant to weight or credibility. 
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Utah State Statutes 
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§ 41-6—44.5. Admissibility of chemical test results in actions for driving 
under the influence—Weight of evidence 
(l)(a) In any civil or criminal action or proceeding in which it is material to 
prove that a person was operating or in actual physical control of a vehicle 
while under the influence of alcohol or drugs or with a blood or breath alcohol 
content statutorily prohibited, the results of a chemical test or tests as author-
ized in Section 41-6-44.10 are admissible as evidence. 
(b) In a criminal proceeding, noncompliance with Section 41-6-44.10 does 
not render the results of a chemical test inadmissible. Evidence of a 
defendant's blood or breath alcohol content or drug content is admissible 
except when prohibited by Rules of Evidence or the constitution. 
(2) This section does not prevent a court from receiving otherwise admissible 
evidence as to a defendant's blood or breath alcohol level or drug level at the 
time relevant to the alleged offense. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
§ 7 6 - 1 - 4 0 1 . "Single criminal episode" defined—Joinder of offenses and 
defendants 
In this part unless the context requires a different definition, ''single criminal 
episode" means all conduct which is closely related in time and is incident to 
an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal objective. 
Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit or modify the effect of Section 
77-8a-l in controlling the joinder of offenses and defendants in criminal 
proceedings. 
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§ 7 6 - 1 - 4 0 2 . Separate offenses arising out of single criminal episode— 
Included offenses 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate 
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act 
of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which 
may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this code, the 
act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or convic-
tion and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under any other 
such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single crimi-
nal episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant 
shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the 
defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense 
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included 
offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required 
to establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of prepara-
tion to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein; 
or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an 
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate 
court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence 
to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient 
evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact 
necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included offense, the 
verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a judgment 
of conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity of a new trial, 
if such relief is sought by the defendant. 
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§ 7 6 - 1 - 4 0 3 . Former prosecution barring subsequent prosecution for of-
fense out of same episode 
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more offenses arising out of 
a single criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution for the same or a different 
offense arising out of the same criminal episode is barred if: 
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that was or should have 
been tried under Subsection 76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution; and 
(b) The former prosecution: 
(i) resulted in acquittal; or 
(ii) resulted in conviction; or 
(iii) was improperly terminated; or 
(iv) was terminated by a final order or judgment for the defendant that 
has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated and that necessarily required a 
determination inconsistent with a fact that must be established to secure 
conviction in the subsequent prosecution. 
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted in a finding of not guilty 
by the trier of facts or in a determination that there was insufficient evidence to 
warrant conviction. A finding of guilty of a lesser included offense is an 
acquittal of the greater offense even though the conviction for the lesser 
included offense is subsequently reversed, set aside, or vacated. 
(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted in a judgment of guilt 
that has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated; a verdict of guilty that has not 
been reversed, set aside, or vacated and that is capable of supporting a 
judgment; or a plea of guilty accepted by the court. 
(4) There is an improper termination of prosecution if the termination takes 
place before the verdict, is for reasons not amounting to an acquittal, and takes 
place after a jury has been impanelled and sworn to try the defendant, or, if the 
jury trial is waived, after the first witness is sworn. However, termination of 
prosecution is not improper if: 
(a) The defendant consents to the termination; or 
(b) The defendant waives his right to object to the termination; 
(c) The court finds and states for the record that the termination is 
necessary because: 
(i) It is physically impossible to proceed with the trial in conformity with 
the law; or 
(ii) There is a legal defect in the proceeding not attributable to the state 
that would make any judgment entered upon a verdict reversible as a 
matter of law; or 
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the courtroom not attributable to the 
state makes it impossible to proceed with the trial without injustice to the 
defendant or the state; or 
(iv) The jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; or 
(v) False statements of a juror on voir dire prevent a fair trial. 
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§ 7 7 - 1 - 7 . Dismissal without trial—Custody or discharge of defendant 
(l)(a) Further prosecution for an offense is not barred if the court dismisses 
an information or indictment based on the ground: 
(i) there was unreasonable delay; 
(ii) the court is without jurisdiction; 
(iii) the offense was not properly alleged in the information or indict-
ment; or 
(iv) there was a defect in the impaneling or the proceedings relating to 
the grand jury. 
(b) The court may make orders regarding custody of the defendant pending 
the filing of new charges as the interest of justice may require. Otherwise, 
the defendant shall be discharged and bail exonerated. 
(2) An order of dismissal based upon unconstitutional delay in bringing the 
defendant to trial or upon the statute of limitations is a bar to any other 
prosecution for the offense charged. 
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§ 77—2-1. Authorization to file information 
Unless otherwise provided by law, no information may be filed charging the 
commission of any felony or class A misdemeanor unless authorized by a 
prosecuting attorney. 
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Addendum B 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
OSCAR IVAN CORNEJO, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
WITH PREJUDICE _, 
Case No. 041900798 FS '-
Honorable Roger S. Dutson, w 1 
DEC 3 0 2004 
*n 
FACTS 
Defendant Cornejo was charged by the State in February 2004, with four offenses: 
(1) Third Degree Felony-Evading, 
(2) Third Degree Felony-DUI with priors, 
(3) Class B Misdemeanor-Revoked Drivers License and, 
(4) No Insurance. 
The defendant posted bail of $ 11,750.00 to get out of jail after this arrest. He hired a private 
attorney to represent him. After some substantial delays by the prosecution in providing a copy of 
a video tape of the arrest to defendant's attorney, a preliminary hearing was finally held July 9,2004. 
At a hearing on October 18,2004, a two-day jury trial was scheduled for December 15 and 16,2004. 
At that time, the Court also heard argument on a Motion to Suppress Evidence, filed by Defendant 
claiming an improper arrest. The Court ruled against Defendant on that motion. The state issued 
subpoenas on October 20,2004 for numerous witnesses. Several additional pre-trials were held with 
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Defendant and his attorney present, and at request of Defendant, an additional firm-set back-up trial 
date was requested and could not be found until February 3 and 4th, 2005. However, on December 
6, 2004 it was confirmed and agreed by both parties the trial would start on December 15th. 
On December 15th, the jury panel of about 20 persons appeared and were in the courtroom 
awaiting the selection of the eight jurors needed to try the case. Prior to actual selection of the jury, 
counsel asked to meet with the Court in chambers. At that time, in chambers, the Court was first 
informed by the prosecutor that the Defendant had refused to provide a breath or blood sample at the 
time of the DUI arrest and the police officers had gone ahead, over the defendant's objections, and 
drawn an involuntary sample of blood and tested it for blood alcohol content. The Defense attorney 
stated he would object to the admissibility of the blood test results, though he stated that part of the 
defense theory was to show oppressive and illegal police misconduct and therefore, the defense 
strategy was to allow the facts surrounding the involuntary blood draw to be presented, but if the 
prosecutor intended to offer the test results, the Defendant would object to its admissibility. 
The Court advised the parties that the admissibility of the blood test was a legal question and 
if they wished to present evidence regarding the same, it should first be done outside the presence of 
the jury. The prosecutor, Brenda Beaton with the Weber County Attorneys office, then stated that 
she had not intended to call the officer who decided to take the blood draw and attempted to criticize 
defense counsel for not filing an objection to the blood test in advance of trial. The Court advised 
Ms. Beaton that it was her burden to present evidence of admissibility and we were going to go ahead 
with the hearing on admissibility, prior to actually empaneling the jury. Ms. Beaton then told the 
Court she was unprepared to present the necessary evidence regarding admissibility. The Court 
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informed her that it would direct the jury panel to return after the lunch hour and allow her additional 
time to prepare for the blood test issue and that hearing would be held later that morning. While still 
in chambers, Ms. Beaton then asked for a continuance of the trial. Defense strenuously objected as 
they were prepared to try the case as scheduled. The Court denied the motion to continue as being 
untimely and without good reason. The prosecutor then told the Court that if it made her go to trial 
as scheduled, she would move to dismiss the charges and then refile them at a later time. The Court 
advised Ms. Beaton that if she attempted to dismiss the charges at this time, the dismissal would have 
to be with prejudice and they could not be refiled. The defense objected to a dismissal and refiling 
of the charges as they were prepared to go to trial as scheduled and it would be prejudicial to 
continue the matter. The Court told the prosecutor to prepare for the admissibility hearing. 
The Court convened, informed the jury panel that some legal issues needed to be resolved and 
the panel would be excused until 1:30 p.m. After a substantial recess the Court directed the 
prosecutor to proceed and she refused to do so, stating again that she was unprepared to go forward 
because she had insufficient evidence to go forward on the DUI case. She moved to dismiss all 
charges. The Court then discussed the need to go forward with the trial on the other charges, even 
if she did not try the DUI and informed her that it would bifurcate the trial and allow her to come 
back later to try the DUI separately if her threatened appeals for denying a continuance or dismissal 
by the Court with prejudice were favorable to her. The Court encouraged her to proceed with the 
blood test issue. She refused. The Court encouraged her to try the other three charges while the 
jury was available. She refused. She gave no reason. It appeared to the Court the evidence on the 
other three charges would be separate from the blood test issue. She refused. The Court was aware 
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from the file that several witnesses had been subpoenaed. The Court then engaged in multiple efforts 
to persuade her to go forward with trial of at least some of the charges as her witnesses had been 
subpoenaed, the jury was available and it would be a lengthy delay before the Court could again find 
a two-day trial setting. She refused. Ms. Beaton again moved to dismiss all charges, stating she 
would refile then at a later time. Defense objected and requested the trial proceed or the charges be 
dismissed with prejudice. 
Factually, the only reason given to this Court for not trying this case was because the 
prosecutor, Ms. Beaton, was unprepared to present a foundation for the admissibility of the blood 
test and/or her refusal to try the case as scheduled, without giving any factual or legal reason why the 
trial should not proceed. She argued that dismissal and the subsequent refiling of these charges was 
purely discretionary with the prosecutor, not the Court, and asserted the Court has no jurisdiction to 
dismiss the charges with prejudice or prevent her refiling the charges at a later date. 
The Court granted the prosecutor motion to dismiss the charges but as the Court had advised 
the prosecutor, they were dismissed with prejudice. 
LEGAL ISSUES 
I- Does an unprepared prosecuting attorney have the right to cancel a jury trial for no reason 
other than prosecutor unpreparedness, on the day of a trial scheduled a substantial period of time in 
advance, with the jury panel present and defendant and his attorney present and ready to proceed, by 
moving to dismiss the charges without prejudice? 
II- What is the authority of a court under the foregoing circumstances to dismiss criminal 
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charges with prejudice, thereby preventing the refiling of those charges? 
The United States and Utah Constitutions provide that a defendant in a criminal case has the 
right to a speedy and public jury trial. 
The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 25 provides as follows: 
"(a) In its discretion, for substantial cause and in furtherance of justice, the court 
may, either on its own initiative or upon application of either party, order an information 
or indictment dismissed. 
(b) The court shall dismiss the information or indictment when: 
(b) (I) There is unreasonable or unconstitutional delay in bringing defendant to trial; 
(d) If the dismissal is based upon the grounds that there was an unreasonable 
delay, or the court is without jurisdiction, or the offense was not properly alleged in the 
information or indictment, or there was a defect in the impaneling or of the proceedings 
relating to the grand jury, further prosecution for the offense shall not be barred and the 
court may make such orders with respect to the custody of the defendant pending the filing 
of new charges as the interest of justice may require. Otherwise, the defendant shall be 
discharged and bail exonerated. 
An order of dismissal based upon unconstitutional delay in bringing the defendant 
to trial or based upon the statute of limitations, shall be a bar to any other prosecution for 
the offense charged. . . . " 
ISSUE I. URCrP 25 clearly permits the dismissal of the charges by this Court where the 
prosecutor has no valid reason to dismiss or proceed with trial. It is certainly unreasonable for a 
prosecutor to be unprepared for a trial of this nature with substantial advance agreement on the trial 
date. It is unreasonable to cause a defendant to appear numerous times with private counsel, and then 
appear for trial prepared to go to answer serious criminal charges, have a jury panel of some 20 
citizens present for selection of a jury to hear the case, have the Court block out two days of an 
extremely busy trial calendar, and at the mere whim of the prosecutor, demand a continuance and 
State vs. Cornejo 
Findings, Conclusions and Order 
Case No. 041900798 FS 
Page5 of 13 
0 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
when denied as being untimely and without justification, attempt to force the Court into a continuance 
by moving to dismiss and refile the charges under what she argues is an absolute prosecutorial 
discretion. Rule 25(a) clearly permits dismissal of the charges without prejudice by the Court under 
these circumstances. 
ISSUE n. The more important question however, is whether or not the Court has the 
authority in this case to dismiss the criminal charges with prejudice. Courts should consider many 
factors before dismissal of criminal charges because in general, society has the right to demand that 
a person who commits criminal acts should not be allowed to avoid punishment without a trial and 
then, charges should only be dismissed with clear good cause being shown. Therefore, dismissal of 
criminal charges with prejudice must be based on a very important reason, including unconstitutional 
delay or based upon the statute of limitations. On the other side of the coin, a person charged with 
a crime should not be subjected prejudice due to extremely unfair or unjust prejudicial practices of 
a prosecutor such as acting on a whim or readily foreseeable unpreparedness for trial. So, even 
though the Court could clearly dismiss these charges for 'unreasonable delay' in this case, do these 
delays rises to the level of mandating dismissal with prejudice. 
Utah case law sets forth a number of factors under Rule 25(d) for the Court to consider in 
determining if there is unconstitutional delay. Each case depends on its own facts. Most tests of 
whether there has been an improper constitutional delay focus on four factors: the length of the delay; 
the reason for the delay; the defendant's assertion of the right to a speedy trial; and the prejudice to 
the defendant resulting from the delay. See Barker v Wingo, 407 US 514, 92 SQ2182 (1972), State 
vHafen, 593P.2d 1026(Ut 1979)StatevKnill, 656P.2d 1026(Ut 1982), StatevOssana 739P.2d 
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628 (Ut 1987), State vLyva, 906P.2d910 (Ut 1995). These factors must be balanced by the Court 
in determining if there is an unconstitutional delay. 
LENGTH OF DELAY. The actual length of time of the delay is generally not as critical as 
the reasons for the delay, who causes the delay and prejudice to a defendant. Valid or justifiable 
reasons for delays generally justify such delays. Overcrowded court calendars justify many delays. 
Proper legal motions timely filed generally justify delays. However, the United States Supreme Court 
has made it clear that a deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be 
weighted heavily against the government. See Barker v Wingojd 
This Defendant was booked into jail on February 11, 2004 and shortly thereafter, bailed out 
of jail. Trial was scheduled for December 15, 2005. Defendant had been required to appear 
numerous times before the Court for arraignment, motions, pre-trials and then for trial. The 
prosecution substantially delayed providing a video tape of the arrest to the defense attorney. After 
entering his pleas of not guilty, defendant's attorney had always asked for the trial to be set at the 
earliest possible time. Had this Court continued this case on the day of trial, the next available date 
for trial was February 3-4, 2005, as that was the firm-set backup date given on November 15,2004, 
at a pretrial conference, an additional delay of over 30 days. That would have caused this case to be 
tried about one year after the arrest and much of the delay would have been caused by a heavy court 
and prosecutor calendar, substantial delays by the prosecutor in providing the video tape of the arrest 
to defense, and unjustified delay from December 15th. This Court has a very busy trial calendar and 
for some reason, Ms. Beaton's trial calendar seems to be more crowded that any other prosecutor's 
calendar, as she more frequently rejects trial dates suggested by the Court than do other prosecutors. 
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However, she is very aware of the difficulty of getting early trial dates and should be aware that any 
continuances and loss of assigned trial dates would severely impact not only this case, but the many 
other cases that need trial time, including persons who are incarcerated. Though, the length of delay 
in this case is very substantial, some of the delay was for filing and hearing a defense motion and then 
because of the Court's busy calendar and the Court will assume Ms. Beaton's busy calendar causes 
only justifiable delays. Some delays early on appeared to be for the prosecution failure to provide the 
video of the arrest as requested and directed by the Court. In balancing the length of time issue and 
reasons for delay, the delay from any continuance from December 15, 2004 added to substantial 
delays that are not at all the faults of defendant, and potential after that trial date, must be weighed 
very heavily against the government in considering unnecessary delays imposed on a defendant. 
Length of delay caused by the government, standing alone, does not justify dismissal with prejudice, 
but is one of the factors to be considered. 
REASON FOR THE DELAY. On the day of trial, the prosecutor came to court 
unprepared to present basic essential evidence to support the admissibility of a blood test derived 
from an involuntary blood draw at the time of arrest. She gave no explanation except that she did 
not expect the defendant to object to the test results being admitted. There was absolutely no reason 
for her to think that. Because of her mistake in preparation, she even told the witness, who had made 
the decision to involuntarily draw blood from the defendant that he did not need to appear for trial. 
She never asked the defense attorney to stipulate to admissibility of the blood test and defense did 
nothing to indicate it would not object to the involuntary blood draw and test results. It is very clear 
under Utah law that involuntarily drawn blood can only be used under very limited circumstances. 
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Certainly this is an issue which requires preparation by a prosecutor before trial. Additionally, Ms. 
Beaton, an experienced prosecutor, made a basic mistake recognized by even inexperienced 
prosecutors by assuming the Court would allow the admissibility of any blood test without proper 
foundation in a DUI case. With a busy calendar, perhaps her mistakes could be justified, but for her 
to then aggravate the situation, she refused to proceed with the trial on the other charges, upon denial 
of her untimely motion to continue the trial and the Court's agreement she could bifurcate the DUI 
and try it after possible successful appeal. She then made matters even worse by attempting to force 
the Court into continuing the case in another manner; i.e., moving to dismiss and refile at a later time. 
Certainly somewhat ingenious, but grossly misdirected and abusive of the criminal justice system. The 
defendant and his attorney were prepared for the scheduled trial and objected to a continuance, 
pointing out the hardship, expenses and emotional drain this would cause the defendant. The Court 
was prepared for the scheduled trial. The jury was prepared for the scheduled trial. Apparently, all 
of the other prosecution witnesses had been subpoenaed and were prepared for the scheduled trial. 
The Court personnel and bailiffs were there for the scheduled trial. This Court cannot understand the 
prosecutor conduct except that she could not accept the fact that she made a human mistake of 
judgment regarding her preparation for this issue and she refused to resolve it properly as she should 
have and moved on. Rather, she wanted everyone else to jump out of her way and give in to her 
whims, including the defendant who was ready for trial. This is an inexcusable deliberate attempt by 
this prosecutor to unjustifiably delay the trial and hamper the defendant in bringing the matter to a 
resolution. Further, there is no excuse for not trying the remaining three charges under permission 
from the Court to bifurcate the DUI and allow an appeal of the Court's ruling on the DUI issues. 
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Therefore, the reasons for the delay are without any factual or legal justification and appear 
to this judge to approach prosecutorial misconduct. Under Barker v Wingo, Id, the reason for the 
delay in this case must be weighed heavily against the government and in favor of defendant. There 
was a deliberate unjustified manipulative attempt by the prosecutor to delay the trial in order to 
prevent the case from being tried as scheduled and preventing the defendant from having his case 
resolved speedily. The defendant objected to the delay and did not waive his right to a speedy trial. 
This trial did not get completed as soon as it reasonably should have. 
DEFENDANT'S ASSERTION OF SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHT. Defendant and his 
attorney have from the very beginning of this case requested the Court set hearings and the trial at 
the earliest possible dates. Although they have been reasonably accommodating when the Court or 
prosecutor could not set earlier dates, they have been available and requested early dates. The 
defendant has objected to continuance of the trial and cited a valid basis for the objection. Defendant 
objected to the prosecutor's request to dismiss the charges and refile them. Defendant requested trial 
of the additional three charges once the prosecutor stated she could or would not present evidence 
on the DUL Defendant has fully preserved his right to a speedy trial and objected to further delays. 
PREJUDICE TO DEFENDANT BY DELAY. Emotions. A common prejudice to 
defendants whose right to a trial are improperly delayed is the anxiety they suffer having been charged 
with serious criminal offenses and not being able to have them resolved in a timely fashion. This is 
a difficult emotion to measure quantitatively, but placing an ordinary prudent man in a position of 
realizing that he faces two felony charges, each carrying possible penalties of up to five years in the 
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Utah State Prison would clearly create substantial emotional distress. Add to that the two 
misdemeanor charges and the emotional stress must increase at least somewhat. The defendant and 
his attorney had undoubtedly prepared for trial and came to court on December 15th under the 
reasonable assumption that within the two days of trial the uncertainty of being convicted or found 
innocent would have been resolved. This build up of emotion for a defendant must be very 
substantial. Then the let down of not having the case finally resolved and necessity of possibly having 
to go through all this again, as requested by the prosecutor, must have been a tremendous emotional 
upset to the defendant. A speedy trial right is designed to minimize anxiety and concern of an 
accused. State vMiller, 747P.2d440 (Ut 1987), Barker vWingoJd. 
Financial Burden. There have been multiple hearings prior to trial and the defendant has been 
represented at all times by his private attorney and undoubtedly has incurred great financial expenses 
for his attorney which would now be greatly aggravated by a totally unjustified increase of expenses 
if a new trial were permitted. Nearly a half day with his attorney were spent attempting to get the 
case tried on December 15th. There had undoubtedly been several hours just before trial getting 
prepared for the actual trial. All those expenses were wasted for the reason the case was not tried. 
It appears to this Court that this defendant has been caused substantial unnecessary financial burden 
by the prosecutor's unjustified conduct herein and this amounts to a taking of his material means 
without justification or due process. In reaching this conclusion, this Court has not taken into 
consideration the normal expenses this defendant has incurred in defense of this case, but only those 
unnecessary expenses which have been hoisted upon someone already burdened with substantial 
financial obligations for attorneys fees. 
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This defendant has consistently requested a speedy disposition of his case and objected to any 
further delays, preserving his right to have the Court consider the fact that he is substantially 
emotionally and financially prejudiced by this prosecutor's improper failure to proceed with this trial 
when it was scheduled. 
This Court concludes that the prosecutor's conduct in this case, combined with all other 
existing factors relevant to the speedy trial right of this defendant under the Utah and United States 
Constitutions and Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure require the Court to dismiss all 
charges with prejudice and the prosecutor be barred from further prosecution. In doing so, the Court 
recognizes that such a dismissal which prevents a defendant from being held accountable for alleged 
serious criminal misconduct should only be carefully exercised after balancing the community's rights, 
important constitutional rights of a defendant and important basic concepts of fairness in the criminal 
prosecution of cases. 
DATED this ^ 7 day of December 2004. 
ROGER ^DUTSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings, 
Conclusions and Order by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the following parties this -Z^Ulday of 
December 2004: 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(The following was held in chambers.) 
THE COURT: I understand that you've resolved the 
issue of the two priors or --
MR. MCKAY: Six, eight priors. 
MS. BEATON: Yeah, six. 
THE COURT: I mean two within 10. At least two 
within 10? 
MS. BEATON: There's six but — 
THE COURT: How many within 10? 
MR. MCKAY: Well if it — 
MS. BEATON: Six. 
THE COURT: Six within 10 years? 
MS. BEATON: Yeah. I think I've got three or four 
certifieds with me. 
THE COURT: Okay. But is that resolved? Are you 
going to be contesting that issue? 
MR. MCKAY: You know, it's -- I think we've agreed. 
THE COURT: Well, let me -- let me just tell you the 
downside for you, Chad — Brenda, would you twist that thing 
so that the sun is not shinning quite so brightly? 
MS. BEATON: Sure. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
The downside for you is technically Brenda has the right 
to prove all of them that she wants within a 10-year period 
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of time and you can argue that that prejudices his case, but 
that's the way the statute reads, you know, so — if you 
don't resolve it in some manner then I don't know how to tell 
this jury what they're doing. Otherwise, I tell them this is 
a felony DUI but we are asking you only to determine whether 
or not there's a basic violation of the DUI law in so --
MR. MCKAY: Yes. It's my understanding that we had 
agreed that -- and correct me if I'm wrong -- and that's why 
I didn't have any problems with these -- this verdict form is 
that I think you even sent over an instruction that if they 
find him guilty of the DUI, that we will send them back into 
the room to find the other elements and basically will be 
certified but it's (unintelligible) --
THE COURT: Well, it's a -- it's a legal question if 
you want make it such or I can send it back. You see, 
they -- if I take it from the jury, it has to be clearly 
agreed that I can do that part of it separate from the jury. 
Otherwise, I have to give it to the jury. I don't have any 
choice. 






Well, it's up to you. 
— to prove that part of it so — 
Chad, it's up to you to decide so 
I have --
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MS. BEATON: -- and you have to decide now. Because 
in the beginning of a case, I'm going to tell them what the 
basic elements of an offense are so they can know what to be 
looking for before they start the case. 
MR. MCKAY: Well, and I — you know, I'd even 
stipulate that if they find the DUI that he has the priors, 
and therefore, that's really all they'd have to find. 
MS. BEATON: Well, here's a couple other issues 
that -- I guess the real issue is whether or not it comes in 
in the case in chief that he has all these priors. 
THE COURT: It can. 
MS. BEATON: And so here's --
THE COURT: But it doesn't have to. 
MS. BEATON: But we're running into two problems; 
one, the videotape of the pursuit and the aftermath of 
that — 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MS. BEATON: -- involves Trooper Jones mentioning on 
the video at one point that the defendant's been arrested six 
other times. It doesn't necessarily say for DUI, but it 
suggests. 
MR. MCKAY: And I have no problem with that that 
they just -- you know, that's just a risk we'll have to take 
because I think they got to see the video. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
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MS. BEATON: I think the other • the other i ssue 
.
 :s -here's a force(^ blood draw in this case, and I lie • 
.jrceu . Lood draw was done because the defendant had six 
..liors within 10 years and :•••• '; '- ••• d-" • •'••"* . -
they felt like it was an emergency situation So they did 
THE COURT: ? 
• MS. BEATON: No. This was an initial refusal and 
t h e n t h e y a i e 1 »"d I i in j 11 J MI < '" i <» y o i. n q I 11 I i »n <j i IJ d w 
then, and then he I mean, he does stick out his arm and 
they don1"! L I V M I It,. LI In in divvii < . 'I inyth.ny, s'uu I JH(»W 
MR. MCKAY.1 I " ni going to argue a bunch of stuff on 
lha t so --
MS. BEATON: But so 1 thi nk if he's going „ 
i rg i le :i t -- , 
THE COURT: ¥!e ] ] , that a that's going to be 
-i rg ued a s a ] ega ] i ssue? 
MR. MCKAY: . _ least •  nothing is 
Perfect 11 I I'm i pi i in :ng up that 
information, I'm just going :o qo through the procedures and 
pol :i c:i P S , whether Ihiey f.O: . ..• •> • o c r n ^ ^ . , :;at * s --
M S . BEATON: And \..h> 'he or obi em is :i f there's a 
,]
 ^si : • u . : . _n. / improperly forced the 
'"-ood draw 
: Ml J-huh. 
MS. BEATON: Because this jury is going to think, 
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well, that seems unusual, why would they do that, you know, 
because they don't do that normally. 
MR. MCKAY: That's what we want them to think. 
MS. BEATON: If they think it's unusual, I think 
that I have to be able to explain to that jury well the 
reason that it was done in this particular case is because 
the defendant was refusing field sobrieties, because the j 
defendant refused the chemical test, because he had six 
priors, and because he had just been involved in an evading, 
the officers felt like it was an exigency circumstance and , 
they then decided with the sergeant's approval -- or well, 
with actually the sergeant's instruction to force the blood 
draw. 
MR. MCKAY: Can you say it all without bringing up 
the six priors? Because I don't think the statute 
requires --
MS. BEATON: Yeah, but I think that factors in. 
MR. MCKAY: I don't think that they — one of the 
factors as I read the --
THE COURT: Well, let me interrupt — 
MR. MCKAY: -- the statute — 
THE COURT: Let me interrupt both of you here. 
MR. MCKAY: Okay. 
THE COURT: First, Chad, you have not brought up the 
legal implications or questions that might surround the blood 
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draw. You had another motion but it didn't affect that blood 
draw at al 1 . 
MR, MCKAY: Well, we brought: it: up in the prelim,.. 
You knoi v i i inderstai id :i ng ' ' • ' ' • 
THE COURT: Well 
MR.. MCKA Y. -.-.. - .•=•-.- .;-pres.;.on ' 
hearing? 
THE COUR T, " \1 I 1 m '" iiupiesijioti hearing --
MS. BEATON: Wait, Do you 
THE COURT: . brought up, 
MR. MCKAY: Right, We were just saving it for 
1
 r i a I " I " ! . 11 ' h it •.'!."" I - - • " ' ' ' 
THE COURT: Well, but It's a legal griestion as to 
"hevJiei; i i M.M- I h» > uiuou ,JI aw is proper. You see, if he had 
.
:
*d nri opportunity • • take a test, that legally can cuiue ± 
•...-.".; .=.; Ts a - !;.nk a very sta** a ~*lea: 
statutory provision that, you can just mention that ne 
refused, bcisical 1. > r, IT it i t; you ' re going to contest the 
'/alidity of the blood draw, that is iiuc a jury Question. 
That is d judge question. 
MR. MCKAY: YThb„ All I'm saying is that --
THE COURT: ._..,, i
 S l ^ o be heard outside 
the hearing of the jurcijj, and this is a heck •' be 
I >r. ijiy iny it up. 
MS. BEATON: And frankly. -;he state's in a position 
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where because we had a motion hearing and because of what had 
happened at the preliminary hearing and there was some 
suggestion that Mr. McKay thought that this was improper, I 
actually sent him over a copy of UHP's policy regarding when 
they'll do forced blood draws, anticipating that that's the 
motion we're going to get. Then I figure, okay, he's looked 
at the issue and decided under State versus Rodriguez that 
this was an appropriate situation for a forced blood draw. 
He brings up a different issue at the suppression hearing and 
until today is the first time I here that he wants to hash 
this out in front of a jury and suggest that there's 
something improper by it. And I think if he's going to 
suggest that there's something improper, which he may very 
well be able to do as a factual matter in front of a jury, I 
ought to be able to defend it by saying this is exactly 
(unintelligible) --
THE COURT: No. I'm not going to let it go to the 
jury. It isn't a jury question, it's a legal question. 
Whether that blood draw is purely a legal question. It is 
not a matter to be heard by the jury, unless I allow it to 
come in, then you can raise it if we get past the first 
hurdle. 
MR. MCKAY: Yeah. And all I'm saying is, your 
Honor, she --
THE COURT: But you can only then -- you know, I'd 
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instruct them that the blood draw is legal, basically, that 
/mi kuo" MII Id In' | ln» nil i] aile MI ILMIUSJ'MJI, ji | determine it-
is a legal blood draw. .' J 
MR. MCKAi: , --
THE COURT: I don't know I haven't reviewed the 
I'riSR that" .lutiinr i v.ij i M lm i I ong tnnu. I know there I 
ne some very limited circumstances where they can draw blood 
i r. nrn a I")'H ^j^pect where he's in an emergency room as a 
result of an accident, for example, I think there.are some 
I 
I'iSes that have held they can draw there for medical 
purposes, and then it can be used for a DUI process, but id • 
t'xceptioi is are pretty limited, as I recall. I 
Brenda, what is your take on what the law 3 i 1 :i tl: :i = 
•: -- . - 0 0 a uz.'i,•'.•-.' I 
MS. BEATON: Bill has this l^suo •'h- ' 
111 id I have been talking about this issue. Stare ver^-. 
Rodriguez is the case that define" -: * h^r »"M M* d .1 M < »«"xl 
draw can be taken in an 2 nstance .i J ice t-his. Because what 
Lhey did in Rodriguez; was, they foiM- -<. • • ;- • .- •• 
woman who had refused all the field s-obrieuies and a :-"':• 
same sort of circumstances that we5 re de • " •••-.-' • -re 
.although they didn't have an evading that proceedeo '* 
the Court then lists ail thesp different fac : 
guess my problem is 1 
THE COURT: Bi it it was a forced blood draw on that Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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occasion? 
MS. BEATON: It was. 
THE COURT: And it wasn't at -- it wasn't for a 
medical exigency then? 
MS. BEATON: No, 
that — 
THE COURT: Well, you see, I would be need to review 
MS. BEATON: But the court did determine that there 
was an exigency as a result of the facts and circumstances 
involving that. But I guess my feeling is that although I 
happen to know the case that is on point, I haven't read the 
whole case. I just pulled the case and handed it to Bill the 
other day because he's got some issue, but I haven't read it 
and I'm not prepared to make this legal argument today. And, 
frankly, I think if the Court wants to make that argument 
first we have got to have a full hearing. 
THE COURT: We've got to have a hearing on that 
issue. 
MR. MCKAY: Your Honor, I'm not trying to skew 
anything but the only thing I was thinking is if she's going 
to bring up any evidence at all about his alcohol, she's got 
to get that in somehow. And the way that she's got to get it 
in I think is to, you know, have the officer testify that 
they took the blood and present the evidence and that's when 
it would come up by way of defense that I believe it was 
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:'!X;roDeriv taicen ana .1 •jive t: hren s p e c i f i c reasons why 
..dees 
* -iC "i z e e 4." •act or: tore -. ~-y fac tua l l y -based 
i ssue 
THE COURT: Bu t ihat's a i - - v • J T r\ .o - • I Y A r : • |- • ,3 >- - -"7 




' d u: 
=a- v conp-.^ei che results 01 a bloou 
..-v •. dxegy ...ci * .. - nnse and then argue 
shonldiru give u r'":y leal weight 
.roumstances, wn.i>.h . s what you'd like 1 I 
J';, you .. •- r;o'-ng "----- have <: o weigh that legal quest'-' 
3<\:\>. . ;. ...op ^neiwise, TlTri going to insist r:vp. : t 
I resolvec outside the hearing of the - • y uii ct '" ;~' • 
. j . : ; J O ' - O i o n , T "F ^ O U T i T a n f f- /•> "j p +- - — 
I M R . MCKAY wvv-j-j., j ^ u . - -
THE COUR*l -- and then raise the problem, y- o 
• oe righr J-Q appeal the admissibij-i' ;' -'o > •:: •• 
;ci.:i .;../ argue +:o th- iury ""hen w; :.-=?: weight do you want. 
~o give _. ^uu adiiiissibiJ.1 ty is a it ; ;'•'--•- * 
" J .;ive up your argument that it was illegally rh on: 
j ":u can argue that, you know, the oprc .--?:- -'- • p.? -,-• .1. 
;
:o overzealous po1 i ce work that was oeirig done against yo. 
i -iient t--> his detriment, or whar •-•  • v .-:
 r 
n-aer sta.ua .3 basically that based on /our previous ^ _ 
••'"-•v. thr previous ioot::"i: •:-.,•:' ; denied, then, _-..-u know, 
OO 
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that's a strategy I guess you'd have to live with. But your 
client would not be able to appeal the admissibility if we 
let the jury hear it all and then you bring in all the 
circumstances. Otherwise, it's a pure legal question I have 
to decide outside the hearing of the jury. 
MR. MCKAY: Why does it — you know, I just as 
soon --
THE COURT: And then if I let it in, you can get the 
circumstances in. if I deny it, then it's a nonissue see. 
MR. MCKAY: I just assume we do it during the trial. 
THE COURT: You would waive the admissibility of the 
results of the blood draw? 
MR. MCKAY: No. I was going to make an 
objection and state the legal reasons why — 
THE COURT: That's the point I'm saying. If you 
want to — 
MR. MCKAY: Right. 
THE COURT: -- if you're going to object to the 
admissibility — it isn't the jury that's going to decide 
whether it's admissible, it's — the judge has to. It's a 
legal question. 
MR. MCKAY: Yeah. But I think I could probably — 
unless the Court limits me, I can probably still get that 
evidence into the jury for a different reason. I mean --
THE COURT: Well, you might -- you might be able 
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1 : :> 
•MR. i Whether they followed the procedures or 
THE COURT: -- *- - _.- .3 evidence --
MR. MCKAY: .;h^ws r i •-* intent 
THF m: {hit be able to get some 
evidence in on :' ' • * -is far •-.•* ndmi ssibility of a test, 
• ._ .• ..... . :r.-. ^ aiuLO makes certain provisions 
:i now r.he Court — m admit the results of a test that is 
. •*;.. ,o yzer or y^i Vrow, the blood alcohol 
•; est ing equipment t- ha t i ? •: s -°d . 
MR. MCKA: ^y^e 1 a^n't understand. Are you 
- aying that that's an option that they not? If I say libal I 
" •.. - . ..; .ney not present that evidence. How do they 
: -rove their -:ase without that evidence? Maybe I" m jn i st :i :i : 't 
. ::.sta:.u: ug v;r.at you're saying. 
MS. BEATON: The j u d a e i -• suqgesHn<{ t-hiat 
THE COUR1 i can s ;vir : : — 
i ^ ^ . i u . ' ., . . n- j . L h i S o i - o i l i t y ••! i . A'. :---:=* , and t h e r e f o r e , 
". :ias t : ;-.e rieci >* i i \ - • • , ~:ge o u t s : !•=> • ; - l ^ a > '•*• 
- - / - - • - - -- 'W • . t^hen all of the circumstances are 
orobably ~f"-ing to Oc coming m . E l :Iei ly 
-se i-;. .ssue, y?u may open the door for them to get it in 
:: certain ways 
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MR. MCKAY: Yeah, 
THE COURT: -- if you're careful on how you raise 
it, it may not, you know, but what I'm saying, it becomes a 
nonissue as to whether or not there was a blood draw. 
MR. MCKAY: I guess if you rule that it doesn't come 
in, then they can't prove their case. 
THE COURT: I don't know. 
MR. MCKAY: If you rule that it does come in, then 
all she has to do is (unintelligible) --
THE COURT: They've got two options — they've got 
two options under the law. If I don't allow the test in then 
their other option is to prove that he was appreciably 
impaired because of the consumption of alcohol or drugs --
MR. MCKAY: Okay. 
THE COURT: — and not safe to drive. 
MS. BEATON: Even though I also have the refusal 
presumption which is I can then argue consciousness or guilt. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MS. BEATON: But I guess the problem that I'm having 
is here, I came today thinking because he had not raised this 
issue, because he had mentioned it at the prelim, and he 
apparently decided not to raise it at the suppression 
hearing, that it was coming in. We were --he believed that 
it was -- under the law it was appropriate so he did not want 
to challenge it and so I could talk about the fact that test 
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came back, "I've given him notice of expert, I've sent over 
i 'Vs , r'" '(••» done ..Ml sorts ol: things L u indicate to him at 
least what my game plan was. 
He and f. ha"" n-* ! diked a .tew di tterent times, and until 
today is the first time hearing that now all of a sudden • 
»o " re going I <,» loilk about iorced bJoud di aw and we're going 
to, you know, make it seem like it's a big deal and all --
THE COUR'I : I '< "I I --
MS. BEATON: • • this kinda thing. 
THE COURT" i -- T'm r^t so concerned about the 
forcing of the blood draw and a^i ^f Lhat n Lhere it 
'jbjectioti to the test coming in. Tf there : c an objection to 
the test coming in, that's a legal question ± 
outside the presence of the jury, and the ju^y uoesn • need 
to hear al 1 the circumstances of it, then I ; /oi 1] d h a:1; ? e to 
decide that. II. doesn't sound like we're ready to go the 
jury on that: issue for sure. 
If you're going to object to the admissibility of the 
test, then I'm going to have to have a special heaxlno ui i on 
Moiny to have to tuJl.y hear this and review the law because, 
you know, in our society in general y<»n don 't fc rce pe< :>ple t : • 
yive blood to incriminate them criminally, unless you're 
under one of the exceptions for a UNA some of tl le 
other purposes that are permitted. And a person can refuse 
to take the test and then J instruct them that there was a 
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refusal to take a test and that's it, or that the evidence 
will show there was a refusal, and that's where we stop. 
Now, as far as you — how far you go getting in the other 
circumstances of forcing the blood draw and all is a 
brand-new issue that I wasn't aware of, frankly. I didn't 
hear the prelim. And I'm not sure --
MR. MCKAY: It was my understanding that you were 
going to review the prelim tape as part of the suppression 
hearing. 
MS. BEATON: Yeah, but that wasn't the issue at the 
suppression hearing. 
THE COURT: I -- I did. 
MR. MCKAY: It was an issue. 
THE COURT: But I think I had a --
MS. BEATON: No, it wasn't. 
MR. MCKAY: Well, I mean as a practical matter, I 
don't have to write out my entire case or defense for you so 
you can prepare for every point --
MS. BEATON: Yes — 
MR. MCKAY: Just like I don't know every point 
you're going to bring up. 
THE COURT: No. But — 
MR. MCKAY: We've been through two 
hearings already --
THE COURT: We're only talking about — 
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MR. MCKAY: it's not like this ^s new. 
Till1"!,! 1701,11! I", l-J'o're only talking about — 
MR, MCKAY: You knew this was coming --
' THE COUR Ti ! \ Je're only talking about the blood 
alcohol . 
MS. BEATON: But the bottom 1 ir.e is we don't have, a 
trial today :i f yoi i're going to object uu Liie lib-cal 
^idjoissibj l.Ity ot the blood draw because that i :?\ v something 
that we just parade out in front of a • someth I rig 
that we al 1 get to write briefs ~n rrua!: -s something that i J~ 
the Court rules against the state i • :/ H-:j rrn 
appealable issue for me, it might be an appealable issue 
y O U t0 g 0 Up Qn. • 
THE COURT: Yeah I'- " m not going to just go 
-.rid give Uiat whole thir-; - - • • -
. nstruct them what's admissible ana w:.ai; isn't, 
MR. MCKM .. :<.-. e n t J.y. 
MS. BEATON: And maybe this whole conversation 
needs --
THE COURT: And that's what you apparently assumed I 
would do -- \ 
MS. BEATON: (i unintelligible) Is mute then 
because the d^f o n 111 \ i (i in i ntel 1 i g i b I w) sI JOW > 11 >, 
MR. MCKAY: 1 eah , 1 mean, my whole case Is baseu 
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THE COURT: You apparently assumed I would do that. 
MR, MCKAY: Yeah. My whole case is based on 
improper conduct, and obviously that includes everything from 
when he started to — 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. I don't have any problem, Chad, 
with you doing that. I don't have any problem --
MR. MCKAY: That's all I'm saying --
THE COURT: -- with you doing everything you can to 
defend your client to the fullest regarding police conduct 
that might affect their bias or prejudice in testifying 
against your client or their credibility, those are fine 
issues to raise. It's just -- we've got a legal issue here 
on the admissibility that is not a jury question, it's a law 
question. And if I allow it in, that probably opens the 
gates for you, but if I deny it, that means they're not going 
to get their test in. And they'd better decide whether they 
want to pursue it under the only remaining element, and that 
is impaired to the degree he couldn't safely operate so that 
limits what they can present then. 
MR. MCKAY: Well, that's your decision, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, that is and that's how I have to 
rule on it. 
then. 
for a 
MS. BEATON: Well, 
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THE CLERK: I don't, know -
MS. BEATON: Ami I duu'l I'm HI/ huw that --
THE COURT: Mr. Cornejo isn't going anywhere. Hell 
he's been around long enough to get seven DUIs, you say? 
MS. BEATON: Yeah. 
THE COURT: He's going to s^cV: around. 
MS. BEATON: It's the Christmas season, he'lL 
. •jct:;i. :,v_ _;-...;„: and driving again. State wants a bench 
warrant i: ""••- doesn't show at the time of trial. 
THE COURT: Wei1 T 'n"! give Mr-. :>ic> ay time to get 
him in for sure if he has to •• 
MS. BEATON: Well ' 'oaay D-Day, though? I 
mean, he doesn't know that w e ! v 
MR. MCKAY: As far as j. -;• .: • --
THE COURT: 
i s he in there now 
MR. MCKAY: 
THE COURT: 
I '"II i IPO i d p 1 lial i '-vim ' n I ' ,<M dei i i h,t j 




. , /: going ::o : go : J 
Lo give Mr McKay a cue-:' * •:..-:• 





'foing to have to add 
The defendant is her e. 
Tie is? 
's a nonissue there. But we're 
:•--;- > tiiis other issue. We got a couple 
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of options. We could ask this jury — do we have enough 
jurors to go to trial yet? Did you --
THE CLERK: I think one more showed up. 
THE COURT: Let's turn this off now and we'll --
(A discussion was held off the record.) 
THE CLERK: Okay. On the record. 
THE COURT: Okay. This is back to the case of State 
versus Cornejo. 
I've determined that there is enough -- enough -- there 
are enough jurors that we could try this case and they are 
available. And I have also ruled that the admissibility of 
the blood drawn from the defendant is a legal question that 
this Court would have to rule on after an evidentiary hearing 
or a proffer of exactly what the evidence is and a review of 
the legal questions that surround that issue, and it was not 
raised prior to today. 
As this record will show, Mr. McKay indicated that he 
intended to -- as a part of his strategy in trying the case, 
that he intended to allow the state to proceed to show the 
evidence that surrounded this blood draw and that could be 
done in the presence of the jury and then he would object to 
the admissibility of the evidence after the state has 
attempted to lay its foundation to justify the admissibility 
of that evidence. 
This Court's not willing to go through that process in 
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the presence of a jury given the fact that it may deny the 
evidence and then that leaves the state with one element that 
they would have to determine if they're going to try and 
prove, and that is if the defendant was impaired so that he 
could not safely operate a motor vehicle under the statute 
and get a conviction. 
So the admissibility of the blood test is a critical 
element of the state's case. And the state has indicated 
they had previously given notice to Mr. McKay they intended 
to put that in and they have their -- what is it a doctor 
lined up — 
MS, BEATON: Toxicologist. 
THE COURT: -- or a technician, a toxicologist to 
come in and testify about, I suppose, the blood draw and the 
test itself. 
MS. BEATON: And the result. 
THE COURT: And the results and asserting that there 
is a blood alcohol level above the .08 grams, I suppose. 
So that being the case, the state --or the Court has a 
jury ready to go. Mr. McKay has indicated off the record, 
and I want to make it a part of the record now that he is 
ready to go to trial, his client is here and he wishes to go 
to trial today on the issue and the state has objected to 
going to trial today until the legal question of 
admissibility by them can be resolved. And I'd like to hear 
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now from both of you to make a record concerning your 
respective arguments. Ms. Beaton, would you like to state 
first what your position is concerning this. 
MS. BEATON: Yes, your Honor. I believe earlier 
that we had discussed that the Court is somewhat unfamiliar 
with the issue, I'm unfamiliar with the issue, and apparently 
Mr. McKay has not felt it was an issue that needed to be 
brought up in a pretrial motion despite the fact that we've 
already had a motion hearing. 
The state feels like its at a disadvantage but because 
it -- there was a mention of it at the preliminary hearing, 
there was evidence that I actually sent over to defense 
counsel to support the forced blood draw, and the fact that 
it did not arise at the supression hearing as one of the 
issues that defense counsel brought up, that it was not going 
to be an issue. 
The state has proceeded with this case as though that 
evidence was coming in by sending notice of the expert, 
sending a copy of the curriculum vitae in case defense 
counsel didn't have it, although it is a state's witness and 
that under the statute right now we're not expected to send 
that, I sent that anyway, and also sent the lab results which 
are also something that was submitted at the time of the 
preliminary hearing so defense counsel had notice that the 
state was planning on using that evidence. The state has 
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prepared its entire case on the premise that that evidence 
would be included as testimony rather than we would have an 
issue in front of the jury as to its admissibility. 
The state's position is, is that if we're going to argue 
this legal issue it's not something that can be readily done 
this morning and then reconvene the jury this afternoon; one, 
because research needs to be done by all three of the parties 
involved in this; two, because it requires an evidentiary 
hearing that requires the state to subpoena witnesses, some 
of which have already been subpoenaed for the trial but 
others of which the state would anticipate calling who are 
not under subpoena by the state and whether or not their 
availability is — it is unknown at this point in time; 
three, I think the state's position is, is that this is an 
appealable issue, possibly by defense if the Court permits 
the admissibility of the forced blood draw in and the 
results; or two, that it would be situational possibly the 
state could appeal this issue because it is so critical for 
determining the DUI in this particular case. 
The state also feels like this is a situation where the 
law does not permit defense counsel or the state to conduct a 
trial by ambush. And we have had a preliminary hearing, 
we've had a pretrial and we've had a supression hearing, all 
of which none of those have indicated to the state that 
defense counsel was going to object to this blood draw until 
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today. 
It's the state's position that this issue needs to be 
resolved so I know when I make opening and closing and the 
context of the questions in which I ask all of the witnesses 
whether or not this type of evidence is going to come in or 
whether or not the state's even going to be able to proceed 
on the DUI depending upon what the ruling is. That decision 
cannot be made today. It needs to be fully briefed and the 
state's position is, is that the trial has to be continued at 
this point in time because we were not given proper notice as 
permitted by the -- as indicated by the statute, notice 
should be given to the party on admissibility-type issues 10 
days prior to the trial beginning, that did not happen 
despite the fact we actually had a supression hearing and 
there was know even intimation at the supression hearing that 
this was going to be the issue at trial. 
THE COURT: Now what section are you citing that 
there has to be notice given in advance of trial as to his 
objection to the admissibility? 
MS. BEATON: I think under the Rules of Civil 
Procedure which apply pertaining to motions, I think it's 
Rule 12, that indicates when motions should be filed and it 
indicates 10 days prior to trial or as soon as practicable. 
This issue has been an issue from the inception when 
discovery was sent to defense counsel when this case was 
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filed, it was brought up at the preliminary hearing, it was 
not contested at the supression hearing and not mentioned as 
any point of contention at any of the pretrials. And today 
the state was first informed by Mr. McKay that this was going 
to be an issue right as we were standing out in the hallway 
prior to the jury coming in. 
THE COURT; All right. Mr. McKay, would you like to 
make a record and your -- regarding your position in this 
matter. 
MR. MCKAY: Yes. Thank you, your Honor. Throughout 
this proceeding it's been fairly informal discovery. We've 
cooperated, passed things back and forth. We haven't had 
formal cut-off dates, we haven't had formal lists that have 
gone out, we haven't even supplied each other with witness 
lists. I mean, it's been very informal. Proper notice is 
not required in this case. Because for me to -- and as the 
Court knows, I'm not required to show all of my case to the 
prosecution, basically write out here, this is everything I'm 
going to do, you go ahead and prepare a response to every 
single thing, that's just not what the law requires. 
The fact that in fact she sent the discovery to me that 
she brought up, particularly what she's referring to are the 
procedures for a forcible blood draw shows that it did come 
up in the preliminary hearing — in fact, I don't think she 
was the one that did the prelim, I think it was Camille. 
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MS. BEATON: No. I was. 
MR. MCKAY: Anyway, it did come up in the 
preliminary hearing in front of Judge Jones. 
MS. BEATON: Jones. 
MR. MCKAY: And that's why they sent the discovery 
to me, so they knew that it was an issue but it's up to me as 
to when I bring that in as part of my strategy. 
Certainly if the Court's going to require that I divulge 
every single objection that I'm going to make in this case 
ahead of time so they can prepare case law and defenses and 
responses to it, that's not the way the law works. I mean, 
I'm not required to -- and she's not required to show me her 
entire case either. I don't know what her witnesses are 
going to say unless I take depositions, which usually, as the 
Court knows, isn't done in criminal cases. You know, I don't 
know how she can claim that she wasn't aware of this issue. 
Obviously she was, she sent me discovery on it. It's up to 
me as to when I bring that in as part of the case. 
I have done my research, but I was bringing it up mostly 
as a procedural issue that the -- it's very fact sensitive 
that did the police officer follow the procedures required 
for the forcible blood draw, yes or no. And that's really 
what it's about. Her witness is here, he can testify as to 
whether he followed those procedures or didn't follow the 
procedures, and that's really all we're saying. Not so much 
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the legal issue that the Court will rule on, but did he 
follow the procedures, and I believe the trier of facts can 
follow those points, yes or no. And that's -- you know, we 
believe he did violate them on at least three particulars but 
it's up to the Court to rule whether that's — 
One other thing, and maybe this is just a legend that 
passes around among the defense bar, but most defense 
attorneys --my brother was a prosecutor and a judge and 
they, at least in Arizona, prosecutors will not try cases 
during December because they believe jurors for the will of 
the season or whatever it is are more lenient. And for that 
matter --
MS. BEATON: Now wait a minute, 
MR. MCKAY: -- it would be prejudicial to my client 
not to have the trial in the month of December but to bump it 
off to when all the debts hit in February. 
THE COURT: Well --
MS. BEATON: That's a bunch of crap. 
MR. MCKAY: Whether it carries weight or not --
THE COURT: Just a minute. Just a minute. 
MR. MCKAY: — I'm just telling you that's an 
argument 
THE COURT: Yeah. That's — that's --
MR. MCKAY: — that it does tend to -- I mean, 
prosecutors don't think about it but --
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
28 
THE COURT: Well, that -- that's — 
MR. MCKAY: - we do think about it. 
MS, BEATON: So you (unintelligible) in December? 
THE COURT: -- may be a fiction or not --
MR. MCKAY: No. I do. 
THE COURT: That may be a fiction but it doesn't 
really matter. I've got a jury out here ready to go to 
trial. 
MR. MCKAY: I think we should do it. 
MS. BEATON: I mean, I think it's an insult against 
me and I want the Court to say that that's a bunch of crap. 
There is no way that that even factors in. 
THE COURT: No. 
MS. BEATON: I would try him on the 24th of 
December, 
MR. MCKAY: I apologize if you're offended by that, 
that wasn't what I meant by it. I'm just saying --
THE COURT: Well, that's -- that's a nonissue. 
Let's not even discuss it anymore. 
MR. MCKAY: I apologize. 
THE COURT: This jury — this jury will decide the 
case based upon the merits, I'm sure. 
MR. MCKAY: I'm sure they will. 
THE COURT: And whether they're charitable because 
it's Christmastime or angry because they've already run up 
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their credit card debt it doesn't matter. 
MR. MCKAY: Or that they need to be shopping instead 
of here listening to the case. 
THE COURT: Yeah. And we're far enough before 
Christmas that it's — it's totally a nonfactor. 
However, I do think it's an important legal issue, that 
is my -- that's my concern on Ms. Beaton's side, it is an 
important legal issue. Strategically I understand where you 
were coming — are coming from and it isn't your obligation 
totally to object in advance through motions in limine. The 
problem is as a judge in managing the trial, I have to make 
sure that it's done right and that the proper evidence gets 
before the jury and the improper evidence doesn't get before 
the jury. It's a question of law as to whether or not under 
certain facts a blood draw is permitted and then the evidence 
obtained therefrom can be used by the prosecution. 
I have to also factor in how difficult it is for me to 
find trial dates for two days even, you know, to get cases 
tried because we're heavily calendared and we've set aside 
this date for the jury trial and I don't like to give up my 
trial dates. I have to use as many days for the trials as I 
can. I'm going to rule as follows: 
We're going ahead with this trial today and I'm going to 
excuse the jury until 1:30, we're going to have a hearing on 
the legal and factual issues relating to this. It's now 
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about 15 minutes to 10, we'll start that immediately, the 
witnesses are here for that part of it, I suppose. 
MS. BEATON: You know, the sergeant is the one who 
authorized this and he's not even under subpoena. 
THE COURT: Well, I can't control totally those 
issues but I am going to have the evidentiary hearing as to 
what happened, and I may be fairly liberal on allowing who 
said they could do what. To get the facts in --
MS. BEATON: Your Honor, the state feels like it's 
out of point then and it's going to dismiss and refile. 
THE COURT: No. 
MS. BEATON: I mean, I think this is a serious 
issue --
THE COURT: I'm not going to allow you to refile. 
MS. BEATON: I don't think you get an option to 
say that --
THE COURT: I do. We're going to trial today on 
this case and we will follow that procedure and I'll have the 
hearing. Then I'm going to — 
MS. BEATON: But, Judge — 
THE COURT: — review the law myself and I'll allow 
you two to go to your offices and fax to me or get to me any 
cases that you think are relevant on the issue and I'll make 
a decision and we will start the trial at 1:30. We're going 
ahead. That's all. 
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MS. BEATON: When are we going to have the 
evidentiary hearing? 
THE COURT: Right now. 
MR. MCKAY: Do we need to go over the instructions? 
THE COURT: Not now. 
MR. MCKAY: Okay. 
THE COURT: I'm going to excuse the jury for --
until 1:30, have them come back and then we're going to go 
ahead and try this case. 
(The following was held in open court.) 
THE COURT: Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury panel, 
you've been summoned in today to hear a case that is going to 
go for today and tomorrow, a criminal case. And we have 
determined - or I have determined this morning that there 
are some issues that are purely legal that I need to resolve 
with the parties before we actually proceed with the trial. 
Now, that being the case, I'm going to take the rest of 
this morning to resolve those legal questions that exist. 
And I'm going to have the jury panel come back at 1:30 and we 
will proceed with the trial. We still should be able to be 
done by tomorrow evening. 
Now, the only question I'm going to ask any of you right 
now is are there any of you who have a — an extremely dire 
emergency of some sort that would prevent you from being 
involved with the court for the next two days? Other issues 
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we will talk with you about when we get to the empaneling 
process this afternoon. 
But if there are any of you, for example, who have 
emergency situations, immediate family members in dire crisis 
in the hospital or something like that or something extremely 
serious, including tickets to go to Maui that you bought six 
months ago or something. But anyone that has other than the 
normal busyness of work and of this time of the year, please 
raise your hand and let me know and we may be able to discuss 
and resolve that issue. Otherwise, we would expect you back 
here at 1:30 this afternoon. 
I see no hands and so I take it then that though you're 
not too comfortable with having to come back and delay the 
start, I understand that. It's a matter that I have to 
resolve outside the presence of the jury and you always get 
those kinds of things, and I'll do that before we actually 
even empanel a jury and we'll see you back here then at 
1:30 this afternoon. Thank you. And we're going to ask all 
of you now to leave the courtroom while we have this hearing 
that we're going to have to proceed with. 
(The prospective jurors leave the courtroom.) 
THE COURT: Ms. Beaton, do you have — do you need a 
few minutes to gather things together and be ready to 
proceed? 
MS. BEATON: I need more than a few minutes, your 
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Honor, I think you've already heard what the state's position 
is. That's the problem that we're having here. The state 
feels like it's not prepared, this is an issue that the 
Court's already indicated it's not prepared for so I don't 
know why --
THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to reargue that 
issue. I just want to know how many witnesses you're going 
to need to call, who they are and let's see if we can help 
you to get them here as soon as possible. 
MS. BEATON: Well, I need two witnesses right now, 
one witness who is not even under subpoena which is the 
sergeant who authorized this. 
THE COURT: Well, that one perhaps I can allow in 
through a hearsay basis but let's -- the other witness, when 
were they due? 
MS. BEATON: Well, the other witness obviously is 
going to be the trooper. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. BEATON: So he's here. But problem is that the 
state has is I don't know what the -- I haven't even had a 
discussion with Brad Home as to what the mental thoughts 
were that he was having when he instructed Trooper Jones to 
make sure that a forced blood draw takes place. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MS. BEATON: But troo — but Sergeant Home is the 
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1 one that actually authorizes and makes that decision. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. 
3 I MS. BEATON: Now I don't even know whether or not 
4 I these two gentlemen even had a conversation as to what the 
5 rationale was for this. I'm only guessing as to what that is 
6 because I'm not even given 10 minutes to talk to my officers 
7 to find out. 
8 THE COURT: Do you believe --do you believe it is a 
9 subjective rather than objective standard? 
10 MS. BEATON: I — I don't know what's going into it. 
11 I don't know if they're making objective determinations or 
12 subjective determinations. I don't even know what Rodriguez 
13 says to even tell the Court what exactly all the factors are. 
14 I THE COURT: You're going to trial on it and you were 
15 supposed to be ready to present the evidence and show this 
16 Court how it's admissible, Ms. Beaton. 
17 I MS. BEATON: I think the state's position is, 
18 though, as I've already indicated, I did not think we were 
19 I going to have an admissibility of this issue come to bear 
20 because defense counsel --
21 J THE COURT: You have to anticipate it in every 
22 prosecution. I'll take a 15 minute recess and then we will 
23 have an evidentiary hearing. 
24 The Court's in recess. 
25 (A recess was taken.) 
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THE CLERK: For the record we'll call State of Utah 
versus Oscar Ivan Cornejo, case number 041900798. 
THE COURT: All right. The state may proceed. 
MS. BEATON: Your Honor, if I may, the — I have 
pulled the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MS. BEATON: Rule 12 under motions. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MS. BEATON: It indicates the following shall be 
raised at least five days prior to trial, this is subsection 
C, sub 1, sub B, which indicates that, A motion to suppress 
evidence shall be — shall be brought before the court at 
least five days prior to trial. Subsection A indicates, An 
application to a court for an order shall be by motion, 
which, unless made during the trial or hearing, shall be in 
writing and in accordance with this rule. A motion shall 
state succinctly and with particularity the grounds upon 
which it is made and the relief sought. A motion need not be 
accompanied by a memorandum unless required by the Court. 
The state's position is, is that this motion has -- is 
requesting a supression of evidence of the admissibility of 
the blood draw and it should have been raised at least five 
days prior to trial and has not been raised five days to 
trial. The state is not prepared to go forward today and is 
not prepared on this legal issue. 
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The state does not as a practical matter believe that 
defense counsel or the Court is prepared to go forward on 
this very serious legal issue. It's highly judgmental to the 
state's case if this evidence is not admitted, and it is the 
state's continuing motion that this hearing be rescheduled 
for a different day — 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS, BEATON: -- so all of the parties may have an 
ample opportunity in order to conduct the legal research and 
the writing and motions that are necessary at least 
contemplated by the rules, the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedures, Rule 12. 
THE COURT: I'm denying that request to continue. 
MS. BEATON: Your Honor, then at this point the 
state --
THE COURT: The state is prepared -- must be 
prepared when they have a trial set to proceed to present 
their evidence and have legal basis for that to come in. If 
a defendant objects at a trial, then the Court has to make 
the ruling that it is proper. And then if I make a mistake 
in the ruling, of course, that can be appealed, but the rules 
are that both parties when there's a trial scheduled need to 
be prepared to support, as a matter of law, any evidence that 
they intend to present. 
MS. BEATON: Well --
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THE COURT: It's your burden, not the defense's 
burden to be certain that the evidence is admissible. 
MS. BEATON: Well, even if it's my burden, under 
this scenario, Rule 12 required me to file something in 
writing which I have not done, which I am prepared to do. 
THE COURT: Well, that's not the way I read it so 
you can go ahead and — 
MS* BEATON: Your Honor, at this time the state 
moves to dismiss. 
THE COURT: Denied. This jury is here to try this 
case. 
MS. BEATON: Your Honor, with all due respect --
THE COURT: If I dismiss — let me say, I may 
admit -- I may allow that but it would be with prejudice. 
MS. BEATON: Your Honor, I've also --
THE COURT: We're ready to go to trial. 
MS. BEATON: -- looked at that. Rule 25 indicates 
the dismissal without trial, when that can be done and 
whether or not it can be done with prejudice. The only 
option that would apply is whether or not the Court believes 
that there is unconstitutional delay in bringing the 
defendant to trial. And I believe as we've indicated early I 
don't think that the Court can make a finding that the state 
is trying to delay this matter for no reason. 
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because it is going to other affect whether or not we're 
permitted to appeal, whether or not defense counsel is 
permitted to appeal, and it's obviously a critical factor in 
this junction of the case. 
THE COURT: How much time have you had notice that 
this trial has been scheduled? 
MS. BEATON: This is actually --
THE COURT: Several weeks. 
MS. BEATON: This is actually the first time that 
this case has been set for trial. We actually have a second 
trial date already scheduled because there was going to be a 
trial of mine that was going to bump this trial. 
THE COURT: But this case was set on --
MS. BEATON: This case was set for trial on 
October 18th, 2004. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MS. BEATON: With a pretrial on November 8th. And 
then there was an alternative trial date set on November 15th 
because I notified defense counsel and the Court immediately 
when I believed that the Daryl Anderson case was going to go 
and that it was going to trump this matter. 
And the state is prepared as a practical matter to go 
forward today. The only issue is, is we did not think that 
this would be an issue the admissibility of this evidence 
given the fact we'd already had a supression hearing and 
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defense counsel did not bring that issue at the supression 
hearing, 
THE COURT: Nor did the state ever bring it before 
the Court, 
denied, 
MS. BEATON: I agree. 
THE COURT: We're going to go to trial today, that's 
MS. BEATON: Your Honor --
THE COURT: If I dismiss it, it would have to be 
upon your agreement to dismiss with prejudice, I can do that. 
MS. BEATON: I think the one thing that I get to do 
is I get to dismiss this case if I want to as part of the 
executive branch. The Court has the liberty then to 
determine if it's going to be a dismissal with prejudice but 
the state would ask for findings that it's being made based 
on unconstitutional delay. 
THE COURT: It isn't. I'm just — well, it could 
possibly be. But I -- what I'm saying is the parties are 
here, ready for trial, you should be prepared to go to trial 
today and you've had ample notice of this trial date. And I 
am -- the defense has mentioned in chambers they want the 
trial today, they're here ready to go, and so we'll either 
have the trial today or you can move to dismiss it without 
prejudice — or with prejudice. 
MS. BEATON: I — with all due respect to the Court, 
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I don't think that you get to tell me whether or not I move 
for dismissal with prejudice. 
THE COURT: Well, you can move for dismissal but I'm 
denying the motion. 
MS. BEATON: I -- I think I get to do that. As the 
executive branch, I get to decide whether or not the charges 
are going to be filed or dismissed. You can deny it but the 
denial has to -- I ask for findings then supporting it based 
on unconstitutional delay, because I don't think — 
THE COURT: I'm denying your motion because this 
case has been set for trial, the defendant is here ready to 
proceed, and on the day of trial, it's not a timely motion. 
MS. BEATON: But defense counsel is the one that is 
trying to suppress the evidence, your Honor. 
THE COURT: They are only objecting to the 
admissibility of evidence, Ms. Beaton. 
MS. BEATON: If it's — 
THE COURT: They have that right. 
MS. BEATON: -- suppressed evidence that had been 
admitted at the preliminary hearing. The rules 
specifically --
THE COURT: Do you want to have the trial today? 
MS. BEATON: I don't want to have the trial today 
because this legal issue is pending. 
THE COURT: Well, let's resolve it now then. You 
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may present the evidence concerning this blood draw and I'll 
make a decision on whether it's admissible. I 
MS. BEATON: But I think what the Court -- what the 
state is saying, your Honor, is the state is not prepared to 
make this legal argument today. Because if the Court denies 
the admissibility of this evidence — 
THE COURT: That's your problem, Ms. Beaton, not 
mine. 
MS. BEATON: I --
THE COURT: I have to rule correctly on it no 
matter what. 
MS. BEATON: I agree. And I think that you will 
rule correctly on it but I want -- I want the ability to at 
least file a written motion to indicate to you why I think 
that this evidence is admissible. I also have a difficulty 
because the sergeant who authorized this is on his way to 
Soda Springs, Idaho where he has business, where he — 
THE COURT: I would be very liberal in you 
presenting any evidence concerning the circumstances of 
this --
MS. BEATON: I understand that, your Honor --
THE COURT: — blood draw. 
MS. BEATON: — but I really feel like the state is 
not prepared to go forward. 
THE COURT: And so what are you going to do? Do you 
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want to — 
MS. BEATON: The state is going to dismiss. 
THE COURT: You move to dismiss and I would have to 
dismiss it with prejudice. How about the other charges? 
This is the DUI charge we're dealing with on this one. 
MS. BEATON: The state cannot --is not going to 
proceed with a portion of this case. The state is going to 
proceed with all of this case at the same time. 
THE COURT: You're moving to dismiss knowing that if 
I dismiss I'm going to do that with prejudice? 
MS. BEATON: And the state requests legal findings 
from you as to why. 
THE COURT: Well, because it's an untimely motion. 
I'll hear from defense. What is your position? Let's make a 
record here. 
MR. MCKAY: We agree with the Court. We're here 
ready to go to court. We made all the arguments in chambers 
as to why and why not. We would ask that if that's their 
choice to dismiss that the Court do dismiss with prejudice as 
we're, you know, being brought in here, everybody is required 
to be here. If the tables were turned and it were the 
defense making this motion, I'm certain that the Court would 
rule the same way. Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Now, as I understand the issue, the 
question, the sole question that is the basis for your motion 
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is this Court's dealing with the admissibility of the test 
that was blood drawn after the defendant refused to give a 
test, is that correct, Ms. Beaton? The defendant refused to 
give a test when — after he had been stopped and arrested? 
MS. BEATON: He did. 
THE COURT: And the facts as I was told in 
chambers -- and by the way, I have never been asked to review 
the record of the preliminary hearing, because the only thing 
I was asked to review was the videotape of the officer when I 
denied your motion to suppress, so the record's clear on 
that. 
MR. MCKAY: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And I had no indication until this 
morning that there was even an issue concerning the test, and 
at that time there was some discussion in a chambers about 
the nature of the test. But my understanding is from what 
was discussed in chambers is that the defendant was stopped 
for a traffic violation, and I think as I recall, he pulled 
out onto the road, made a wide turn and the officer followed 
him for some distance with his light on, got up by Adams and 
25th, was it, somewhere? 
MR. MCKAY: Twenty-sixth (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Somewhere around Adams. And that the 
stop then took place after the officer forced him off the 
road in a snow storm, so that's all I saw. And I denied your 
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motion to suppress because I felt that the officer was acting 
totally proper in doing what he did under the circumstances. 
So the issue of the blood test has never been raised before 
in front of me, but apparently it was raised and objected to 
at the preliminary hearing; is that correct? 
MR. MCKAY: Yes, your Honor. 
MS. BEATON: No. We entered -- we entered some 
questioning of Trooper Jones that suggested that defense 
counsel didn't like the way it had happened but there was not 
an objection --
THE COURT: Okay. I see. But circumstances of that 
blood test were given in the preliminary hearing to some 
detail. 
MS. BEATON: Criticized. 
THE COURT: And then some questions were asked by 
the defense attorney as part of his strategy in finding out 
whether there was a voluntary blood test given. But in any 
event, this blood test everybody concedes was not voluntarily 
given; is that correct? 
MS. BEATON: Right. 
MR. MCKAY: That's correct, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And there was some comment that the --
somebody came to draw the blood, I'm sure the officer didn't 
draw the blood, it had to be a technician of some sort. And 
I would assume then a technician was called and when he was 
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taken or Mr. Cornejo was asked to lift his arm he lift his 
arm and they drew the blood. He wasn't physically struggling 
but he had objected to giving a test. Is that a correct 
summary of then what happened? 
MS, BEATON: Yes, your Honor. 
MR. MCKAY: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. And also Ms. Beaton gave to 
the defense attorney the vitae of the blood technician 
showing that she considered his proper qualifications to draw 
blood and then to have it examined, and the testing 
procedures, she had already given information to the defense 
about what she was going to do in that regard, is that 
correct, Mr. McKay? 
MR. MCKAY: You know, I don't recall receiving a 
curriculum vitae but she did send to me the procedures that 
they follow. 
THE COURT: And you're not arguing that --
MR. MCKAY: That she wasn't qualified, no, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: -- that the technician wasn't qualified? 
MR. MCKAY: No. 
THE COURT: And Ms. Beaton, what other information 
was given to the defense so we make a good record here about 
your intent to try and show — or to get the blood test in? 
What else did you do? You sent the curriculum vitae of the 
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technician and a copy, I suppose, of the results of the blood 
test? 
MS. BEATON: And a copy of the results were given 
to the --to defense counsel prior to the preliminary 
hearing. 
THE COURT: Sometime ago. 
MS. BEATON: The results were admitted into the 
preliminary hearing and they were discussed at that time. 
THE COURT: Okay. And I'm assuming that the results 
were more than .08 grams by weigh. 
MS. BEATON: Point one six. 
THE COURT: Point one six. So you had that 
information, Mr. McKay; is that correct? 
MR. MCKAY: That's right, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. And it was simply your 
strategy, Mr. McKay, as you stated in chambers, you were 
going to let all of this come in except the results and you 
were going to object to the results because you felt that it 
was an improper blood draw, that they had no authority to 
draw the blood, is that a — 
MR. MCKAY: That's correct — 
THE COURT: -- a brief summary? 
MR. MCKAY: — your Honor. 
THE COURT: And then you also wanted to get the 
facts relating to the relationship between the defendant and 
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the officers that were involved and you were attempting to 
attack the credibility of the officers because of the way 
they conducted themselves toward your client, is that a fair 
summary? 
MR. MCKAY: That's correct, your Honor. As well as 
the violations of their own procedures. 
THE COURT: So you were using it as a strategy to 
show that aspect as well as objecting to the admissibility? 
MR. MCKAY: Correct, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And the reason you did not file a motion 
to suppress this evidence was because it was part of your 
strategy --
MR. MCKAY: That's correct, your Honor. 
THE COURT: --in doing that? 
MR. MCKAY: Right. Just do it during the trial. 
THE COURT: State have anything further you want to 
say that you haven't said already? 
MS. BEATON: I guess the state's position is then, 
defense counsel can have all sorts of strategies if they 
want, but if they want to actually have this Court suppress 
evidence, it is required by Rule 12 that I actually receive 
five days prior to trial written notice of that motion. That 
would have given all of us, if we would have had five days 
notice, an opportunity to have researched the issue and 
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THE COURT: All right. 
MR. MCKAY: Your Honor, itfs not that I was trying 
to suppress the evidence but an objection — 
MS. BEATON: That's what you just said. 
MR. MCKAY: --to the evidence and to show that 
factually they violated their own procedures in the process. 
THE COURT: But you were challenging its 
admissibility which is similar to a motion but it was just 
going to be done by an objection because you wanted the facts 
surrounding the whole thing to come in. 
MR. MCKAY: Correct, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MR. MCKAY: Which is part of the strategy of the 
defense. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. MCKAY: As we mentioned in chambers, we're not 
required to show them full hand if we're (inaudible). 
THE COURT: All right. Well, I -- I, again, deny 
the state's motion to continue. I assume you have first that 
motion to continue the trial? And then absent the court 
granting that, you are moving to dismiss the case but you're 
moving to dismiss it without prejudice4— 
MS. BEATON: Well, I guess — 
THE COURT: — so you can refile? 
MS. BEATON: — the state — the state would like 
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factual findings as to why the Court does not believe the 
Rule 12 would apply in this case because the word "shall" is 
used --
THE COURT: Well, it's a constitutional violation of 
the defendant's rights in a DUI case possibly, although I 
haven't fully researched it myself and would be prepared to 
rule on that within an hour or so, but it just comes to my 
mind that there's certainly a constitutional issue of due 
process and self-incrimination -- or involuntary 
incrimination when a defendant has a right to refuse to give 
a blood test in a DUI case and suffer certain consequences as 
a result of that because the procedures are established on 
how it is to be done. But again, that is what initially 
comes to my mind about this at least addressing the 
constitutional questions of a defendant's right to due 
process and the incrimination against his own desires similar 
to any other incrimination. 
For example, I — I read the law as being different in a 
DUI case than someone who is convicted of a crime who has to 
give a test for DNA samples because there are statutory 
provisions governing the one and the other as well. I think 
there are statutory provisions on voluntary testing in DUI 
cases, and the exception would have to be persuasive, you 
know, for any court I think to allow it in. And your 
argument is that you think that it's still admissible even 
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though it was involuntarily drawn. 
MS. BEATON: I do think so. And I think that the 
state should be at least given the opportunity to explore 
this in terms of the legal research thatfs involved, in terms 
of the factual development of the evidence that needs to be 
developed with the witnesses that the state chooses. 
And I think really the issue that we're dealing with — I 
understand what defense counsel is saying, they think this is 
simply an admissibility issue. But what it's -- what it is 
asking the Court to do is to suppress evidence that the state 
until today had assumed was coming in. 
THE COURT: And I don't think the state can assume 
that. 
MS. BEATON: Right. So if the Court wants to 
apportion blame, that's fine. 
THE COURT: No. It's not apportionment of blame. I 
understand. Ms. Beaton, you're one of the finest prosecutors 
that I've ever seen, you really are. 
MS. BEATON: (Unintelligible). 
THE COURT: You just are a very diligent prosecutor. 
And I want you to know that there's no blame here, it's just 
something that unfortunately you weren't prepared to deal 
with today and I -- you're one of the most thorough 
prosecutors. And I understand the problem here, you assumed 
something that perhaps shouldn't have been assumed. But 
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anybody that's been a prosecutor or a defense attorney runs 
into these kinds of things and so it's certainly not a fault 
issue. 
It's a matter of I've got a jury here ready to try the 
case, we've got a defendant here ready to be tried, he's got 
a right to have a speedy, public trial and this date was the 
date set for a trial and both sides have to come prepared. 
And this is an issue that based on — I can see where your 
assumption came from, it turned out to not be a correct 
assumption because of Mr. McKay's not raising it before — 
MS, BEATON: Well, I mean he said --
THE COURT: — and you assumed that he had the 
burden to raise it and I'm saying, no, he can object to it at 
trial. That's really where that problem arises. 
MS. BEATON: But I think even when we were back in 
chambers talking about this we were having a difficult time 
trying to determine from Mr. McKay whether or not he was even 
objecting to the admissibility when he had to --
THE COURT: He could be silent about it even, you 
know. He doesn't have that burden. That's one of the things 
about the defense's position is they have many more options 
than I think the prosecution does, I really -- you know, and 
that sometimes may lead to some unfairness. 
MS. BEATON: But there are limits as to what he can 
do. 
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THE COURT: But he's not --
MS. BEATON: And he's asking to you suppress 
evidence in front of a jury — 
THE COURT: Well --
MS. BEATON: -- and that motion to suppress has not 
been filed. 
THE COURT: Well, when I learned about it he wasn't 
saying he was going to move to suppress it, he was just going 
to object to it. It's the same thing as all practical 
matter. He's just going to object to its admissibility at 
the trial. He loves all the facts surrounding it coming in 
so he wanted all of those things as part of his strategy. 
And Mr. McKay, you're stepping on my wire down there. 
MR. MCKAY: Is that what's happening? I'm sorry. I 
heard that noise and I didn't -- I apologize, your Honor. I 
was just trying to stretch my leg. 
THE COURT: Well, it's not your fault because a lot 
of attorneys do it. 
MR. MCKAY: I'm sorry. 
THE COURT: But in any event, Ms. Beaton, before you 
make your motion to dismiss I think I need to discuss with 
you if your motion to dismiss is going to be made, I will 
take that under advisement, but I'm telling you I'll probably 
rule against you on it. And there are other charges here 
that have nothing to do with this test. There's an evading 
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charge, a third degree felony, that has nothing to do with 
the DUI; there is no insurance charge, which has nothing to 
do with the DUI; and there is a driving on a revoked license, 
a Class B, which has nothing to do with the DUI. And I doubt 
that you want to dismiss those knowing that they would be 
dismissed with prejudice, because we could go ahead with 
those issues before the jury. 
MS. BEATON: Well, your Honor, with -- the state's 
position is, is that the state has the ability as part of 
executive branch to brings charges and to dismiss charges. 
If this was a situation where it appeared to the Court that 
the state was doing this just to violate the defendant's 
speedy trial rights, then perhaps that would be a basis for 
the Court to dismiss. 
THE COURT: No, that's not -- that's not the issue. 
MS. BEATON: So the state's position is, is that the 
state has not asked for a continuance of this trial. The 
state is prepared to go but the state now has an issue that 
it does not feel like it's prepared to present at this point. 
There is an alternative trial date that has already been 
set because there was going to be a scheduling problem 
already. This is the first time this case has actually been 
set for trial and this defendant is not in custody, so we're 
not dealing with speedy trial issues involving this defendant 
or the state's desire to delay. Because as the Court has 
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indicated, I have appeared very -- quite a few times in this 
courtroom and I'm not doing anything to delay in any of these 
cases. Nine times out of 10 I'm the one asking if we can go 
forward sooner than defense counsel wants to. But 
nevertheless the state's — 
THE COURT: But I have a jury'here, that's the — 
MS. BEATON: I know. And I did not realize this was 
going to be an issue until this morning, and that may be my 
fault, that may be Mr. McKay's fault. But nonetheless — 
THE COURT: Well, getting past -- getting past that 
issue, what do you want to do with these other three charges? 
MS. BEATON: The state is not --is going to dismiss 
the entire case because it's all part of one criminal 
episode. Because if the dismissal is granted, I believe that 
is an issue the state can appeal, and if that is appealed and 
overturned then the state would be back and we would try all 
of the case at the same time because we would be barred 
otherwise -- if the case came back on appeal for the DUI and 
the evading and the driving on suspension and the no 
insurance had already been tried, we would then be barred 
from the DUI. And as the Court can see the see, the DUI is 
obviously the most serious of the charges that we're dealing 
with here because the defendant is in felony range, this is 
his seventh DUI. 
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because we could try that and I'm not certain that the DUI 
would necessarily be barred based on the fact that it's the 
Court that is telling --
MS, BEATON: It would violate double jeopardy if it 
came back. 
THE COURT: -- you to go ahead to -- well, the 
jury -- no, the jury has not been empaneled yet. 
MS. BEATON: But if we empanel the jury and I try 
the evading, the driving on suspension and the no insurance 
and we reserve the issue on the DUI and I move to dismiss the 
DUI and for some reason the Court of Appeals agrees and they 
return the DUI back to this Court, I would be precluded from 
trying the DUI. 
THE COURT: Not necessarily. So what do you want to 
do? 
MS. BEATON: State moves to dismiss. 
THE COURT: All of the charges? 
MS. BEATON: Right. (Unintelligible.) 
THE COURT: You understand that this case with all 
four counts, if I dismiss I feel I have to dismiss them with 
prejudice because the defense is ready to proceed on them and 
the reasons for the continuance are not justifiable. 
MS. BEATON: By they have to amount to 
unconstitutional delay --
THE COURT: That's in essence what you're doing is 
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you're just dismissing the charges because I am not giving 
you time to address that one issue. 
MS. BEATON: The state does not feel like it's 
prepared with witnesses, with legal analysis to make this 
argument today. 
THE COURT: On the admissibility of the test. 
MS. BEATON: On the issue as to whether or not the 
blood alcohol level should be suppressed. 
THE COURT: Right. Well, or — 
MS. BEATON: And the state does not believe that 
it is doing this --
THE COURT: Or in other words, whether the judge 
should sustain the objection to if it's clearly going to be 
raised like Mr. McKay says he will object. 
All right. If you move to dismiss, knowing that this is 
going to be a dismissal of all of these charges with 
prejudice then I will grant that motion, even though that's 
not what you want, you understand that's what will happen? 
MS. BEATON: The state asks for factual findings as 
to why the state's motion to continue is not being 
granted and why — 
THE COURT: And I will prepare --
MS. BEATON: -- the state's motion to dismiss --
THE COURT: I will prepare the factual basis for the 
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All right. Then these charges are dismissed with 
prejudice. 
(The matter concluded.) 
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